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ABSTRACT 
China’s Housing Market: Determinants and Problems  
 
JUNE 2014 
YUAN NANNAN 
Ph. D., UNVERSITY OF KOBE 
Directed by: Professor YOSHII MASAHIKO 
With the remarkable economic growth in recent decades, China’s housing market has 
developed rapidly, accompanied by high growth of housing price. The multi -level 
housing supply system was established as a solution to the resulting problem of housing 
affordability. However, there exist several problems in multi-level housing markets. In 
turn, this study illustrates the determinants and problems of China’s housing market.  
This thesis consists of five chapters. Given the housing economy is closely related with 
the basic economy and social development, the introduction in Chapter 1 highlights 
economic and social backgrounds, and shows the importance of the housing market in 
China’s national economy. Because of the special relationship between house and land, 
this chapter introduces the development of housing and land policies. Based on the 
development of multi-level housing markets, the chapter summarizes the development 
status of the housing market to illustrate its current problems, including high growth of 
housing prices, decreasing construction of affordable housing, and illegal subsidy policy 
in the public housing market. The following three chapters analyze the related problems.  
Chapter 2 analyzes the macroeconomic determinants of housing prices to illustrate why 
housing prices grow quickly, and the methods that can control housing prices. Housing 
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prices significantly influence economic activity and financial stability; hence, estimating 
their determinants is very important. In general, housing prices depend on the 
fundamental factors affecting the supply and demand of houses. This chapter not only 
uses the basic variables, such as land price, real estate investment, disposable income, 
and mortgage rate, but also includes the policy variables of enactment of “Property Law” 
and “China Banking Regulatory Commission’s Notification of Improvement of the Real 
Estate Credit,” to analyze the determinants of China’s housing prices. The method used is 
a fixed effect model with data from 30 provinces and cities from 2002 to 2012. The main 
results indicate that land prices and disposable income have significant roles in pushing 
housing prices up, while new housing floor spaces and the mortgage rate would push 
housing prices down; the enactment of “Property Law” and the raising of the minimum 
down payment ratio negatively affect the changes in housing prices.  
As a program to ease the problem of housing unaffordability, the implementation of the 
affordable housing program appears to ease the problem of decreasing construction. 
Chapter 3 analyzes its reason, crowding-out effects of affordable and unaffordable 
housing, by using panel data from 29 provinces and cities over the period 1999–2010 in 
China. To examine the dynamic interactions between affordable and unaffordable housing 
construction, this chapter applies the Dynamic Panel Model with controls for 
region-specific and time-specific fixed effects. The chapter analyzes whether affordable 
(unaffordable) housing construction has changed in response to the past and 
contemporaneous construction of unaffordable (affordable) housing. The empirical 
results reveal an asymmetric crowding-out pattern between affordable and unaffordable 
housing. Also, the crowding-out effect of unaffordable housing construction on affordable 
housing construction is related with the urbanization rate. When the urbanization rate is 
lower than 57.39%, unaffordable housing construction would crowd out affordable 
housing construction. Moreover, the crowding-out effect of unaffordable housing on 
affordable housing decreases with rising urbanization rates.  
Although the affordable housing program targets middle- and low-income households 
to help them afford houses, the lowest-income households cannot even rent houses in the 
market. As a result, the public housing program complements the affordable housing 
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program. However, to recover the construction fund as soon as possible, the local 
governments began to sell public housing units to the lowest-income households. To 
illustrate the effects of this illegal subsidy method, Chapter 4 compares the effects of this 
method with another legal method, renting public housing units to households. The 
analysis of this chapter is based on a survey conducted in the city of Baoji, China. How 
can we assess the effects of the two subsidy policies? This chapter applies a 
Cobb–Douglas utility function to measure the extra benefits for households that fall under 
the sell-oriented policy (SOP) and households that fall under the rent-oriented policy 
(ROP). The results indicate that while both policies offer benefit s to households, ROP 
households benefit more than SOP households do. In contrast, the lowest-income SOP 
households have a stronger taste in terms of housing consumption, and so, after buying 
public housing, they acquire more satisfaction. However, both groups of households are 
dissatisfied with the public facilities supplied to the public housing units. The main 
policy conclusions are that although the SOP could improve household utilities, the ROP 
is the more efficient of the two policies. In addition, public facilities to public housing 
units should be considered when undertaking new public housing projects. Finally, 
Chapter 5 summarizes the main results of this study, and presents the limitations and 
direction for future work. 
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Chapter 1 
Evolution and Problems of China’s Housing Market 
1.1 Introduction 
China has achieved remarkable economic growth over the past several decades. The 
annual growth rate of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 9.14% from 1989 to 
2014, with an expansion of 7.4% in the first quarter of 2014 over the same quarter of the 
previous year
1
. In particular, Kim (2014) pointed out that in 2011, China’s GDP of 
US$7.3 trillion rendered China’s economy the second largest in the world. With the high 
growth of the economy, the population and urbanization rate grew fast as well. In 2011, 
China’s total population was 1.35 billion, and the urbanization rate was 51.27% 2. As 
housing is one of the fundamental demands for living, the growing population and 
urbanization raise the demand for housing, thus boosting construction work as well. In 
2011, the contribution of construction, a kind of housing activity, to GDP was about 
6.75%, which indicates a bright future for China’s housing market. In fact, China’s 
housing market started to develop after a series of reforms that began in 1978. The 
housing market has flourished, particularly since the reform of housing monetization in 
1998, and housing prices have grown as a result. With the higher housing prices, housing 
affordability has become a serious problem for households, especially for low- and 
middle-income households (Ren, 2012; Shen, 2012; Chen et al., 2006). Given this  
situation, this research investigates the determinants and problems of China’s housing 
market.  
This chapter serves as an introduction. First, the basic economic and social 
backgrounds are described, showing the importance of the housing market to China’s 
economy. Based on a brief history of China’s housing and land policy, this chapter then 
                                                             
1  Data source: Trading Economics, 2014, available at 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual. 
2 Data are from the China Economic Information Network (CEINET) Database. Urbanization rate refers to 
the proportion of the urban population in the total population. 
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summarizes the status of the housing market development to illustrate the current 
problems. 
1.2 China’s development since 1978 
1.2.1 China’s economic and social development 
Since 1978, China has undergone tremendous market-oriented economic reform, known 
as the “Reform and Opening-up” policy. Deng Xiaoping3, the chief designer of this 
reform, presented the main goals of the economic development as follows: (1) to double 
China’s GDP from 1981 to 1990 to ensure there is enough food and shelter for its citizens; 
(2) to double the GDP again during the 1990s to ensure citizens live a moderately 
prosperous life; and (3) to achieve modernization by 2050, raising income to the level of 
medium-sized developed countries. Under this guidance, the GDP and household income 
increased rapidly. As Figure 1.1 shows, the GDP annual growth rate reached the highest 
value of 14.20% in the fourth quarter of 1992, and the lowest value of 3.80% in the fourth 
quarter of 1990. Figure 1.2 shows that the year-on-year per capita GDP, urban household 
per capita disposable income, and the growth rate increased rapidly. 
In addition, Deng Xiaoping also presented the policy of “letting some people get rich 
first, who then help others get rich.” However, this introduced a level of inequality 
between urban and rural households. As Figure 1.2 shows, for rural households, the per 
capita net income
4
 increased more slowly than that of urban households. The annual 
growth rate of urban households’ per capita disposable income averaged at about 13.45%, 
which is higher than rural households’ per capita net income of 12.96%. In addition, the 
income gap between urban and rural households increased year by year. The proportion of 
rural household income to urban household income was 38.91% in 1978, reaching its 
highest value of 54.87% in 1983, and then dropping to 33.00% in 2013. According to a 
report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the income gap between urban and 
rural households in 2011 was about 26% higher than that in 1997, and 68% higher than 
                                                             
3 Deng Xiaoping (1994–1997) was a Chinese politician who served as the Paramount leader of the People’s 
Republic of China from 1978 to 1992. He was also the chief designer of the Reform and Opening-up policy. 
4 Per capita net income of rural households is equal to total income less expenses for taxes, depreciation, 
operating, and transferring. This concept corresponds to per capita disposable income of urban households.   
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that in 1985 (Duggan, 2013). 
 
Figure 1.1 The annual growth rate of GDP from 1980 to 2012 
Source: The Word Bank
5
 (2014) 
The inequality in income resulted in surging numbers of migrants from rural to urban 
areas, thus promoting the urbanization rate, which reportedly reached 53.73% in 2013 
after growing for years (see Figure 1.2). The increase in the urbanization rate also 
positively affects housing demand. Trend of income and wealth inequality widened 
continuously during the economic transition is the essence of the housing affordability 
problem (Chen et al., 2006). 
                                                             
5 Available at the website: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS/countries . 
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Figure 1.2 Per capita GDP, household disposable income, and urbanization 
rate from 1978 to 2013. 
Source: China Economic Information Network (CEINET) Database.  
1.2.2 The importance of housing economy in China’s economy  
With the improvement in the GDP, China began its housing market in 1987, focusing on 
land and housing reform. From then on, housing and land was no longer granted for free 
to state-owned enterprises and government sectors. As a result, housing construction 
works developed significantly, promoting the development of the housing economy. 
Hilbers et al. (2008) showed that for many countries,  the proportion of housing activities 
such as trading services, construction and renovation, to GDP should be estimated to be 
between 5% and 10%. As shown in Figure 1.3, the ratio of construction to GDP in China 
varied from 3.54% in 1980 to 6.86% in 2013. Since 1992, this proportion has remained 
above 5%. More specifically, the proportion of total construction to GDP averaged 4.30% 
from 1978 until 1986, improving to 5.53% from 1987 to 1997, and then reaching almost 
6% after 1998. Hence, China’s housing industry plays an important role in economy.  
In addition, as leading indicators for real activity and inflation, housing prices can 
5 
 
serve as an indicator of where the real economy is heading (Stock and Waston, 2003). 
Figure 1.4 shows the trends for the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Retail Price Index (RPI), 
Producer Price Index (PPI), and House Price Index (HPI). The curvilinear shapes of these 
indices are similar, but the trends for the CPI, RPI, and PPI lag behind that of the HPI. 
This indicates that housing prices could be a leading indicator of the real economy. In 
summary, the housing industry plays an important role in China’s real economy, resul ting 
in increased interest in the industry by researchers (Barth et al., 2012; Dreger and Zhang, 
2013). 
 
Figure 1.3 The importance of construction work in China’s economy  
Source: China Economic Information Network (CEINET) Database.  
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Figure 1.4 The chains of CPI, RPI, PPI, and HPI. 
Notes and Source: There are no reported data of housing prices from 1991 
to 1994, and 1996. Hence, housing prices are calculated by dividing 
housing areas with respect to housing sales. Then, the chain of house 
price index is computed from these housing prices. Related data of 
housing sales, housing area sold, CPI, RPI, and PPI are collected from the 
China Economic Information Network (CEINET) Database.  
1.3 Development of China’s housing and land policy: A brief 
history 
1.3.1 The transformation of China’s housing system 
This section reviews the transformation of China’s housing system. Many studies have 
documented this transformation and assessed its impacts. This section only summarizes 
them by discussing several major milestones in China’s housing reform. 
The development of China’s housing market has been a gradual and on -going process. 
In China, during the era of the plan-oriented economy, from 1949 to 1978, housing was 
deemed as a welfare good instead of a commodity (Chen et al., 2010). During this period, 
most people in urban areas were supplied housing units according to the welfare housing 
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system, under which the state-owned enterprises, also known as work units, produced and 
allocated housing units almost for free (Chen et al., 2010). Under the welfare housing 
system, the rent was substantially lower than the cost, and thus was unable to cover the 
cost of housing maintenance and management. The management of state -owned housing 
units caused an additional financial burden on work units and the government. Thus, they 
had little incentive for housing investment and improvement. Before 1978, the 
government spent on average RMB 25 billion on new housing construction and RMB 10 
billion on maintenance, but only received RMB 1 billion from rent, which indicated that 
investment in welfare housing was incredibly low (Cui, 1991). Therefore, under the old 
system, China’s urban households experienced a widespread housing shortage and 
continuously deteriorating living conditions (Deng et al., 2009). For example, in the early 
1950s, the per capita living space of urban households was 4.5 square meters
6
, which 
declined to 3.6 square meters until the late 1970s; and about 47.5% families faced a lack 
of housing in 1978 (Li, 1998). In addition, the average ratio of residential housing 
consumption expenditure to total household expenditure was 2.3% in 1975 (Li, 2007; 
Wang, 2014). Hence, the housing market developed slowly during this period, and the 
system was not economically sustainable.  
Within the three decades of housing reform, China’s housing supply system shifted 
from a planned-oriented and state-owned housing system to a market-oriented system. 
From the start of 1979’s economic reforms, it took almost two decades to move from a 
government allocation of housing to a co-existence of a market-oriented allocation and 
government allocation, and finally to a market allocation of housing (Ye et al., 2006). In 
1982, four cities, Zhengzhou, Changzhou, Siping and Shashi implemented a new housing 
subsidy policy named “Three-thirds System,” a subsidy policy for housing sales, under 
which the government, work units and individual could each afford one third of the 
housing cost. However, this policy was terminated in 1985. In 1986,  the housing reform 
leading group set up by State Council proposed to increase the housing rent, which 
indicated the beginning of the national housing reform (Wang, 2014). For example, the 
three cities, Bengbu, Yantai, and Tangshan, increased the per month rent per square meter 
                                                             
6 One square meter is about 10 square feet. 
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rent from RMB 0.07–0.08 to over RMB 1, the proportion of which to housing cost was 
about 75%. Besides, they sold the state-owned housing units at standard prices, charging 
only for construction costs, land compensation fees and relocation compensation fees.  
Then in 1988, the State Council convened a meeting and proposed that urban areas all  
across the country should try to implement the housing reform system. However, serious 
inflation in the second half of 1988 raised the retail price index by 18.5% and foi led the 
implementation of the housing policy reforms. In 1993, about 3 million square meters of 
floor space in old state-owned housing units were sold for only RMB 130 per square 
meter. Especially in July 1994, the State Council issued ‘The Decision of Deepening the 
Reform of the Urban Housing System’ to promote housing commercialization and 
socialization, housing construction and improvement in living conditions.  After 1994, the 
housing development industry and construction developed rapidly. However, instead of 
being sold to individual families, most of the houses were purchased by work units, 
which then resold them to their employees at deeply discounted prices (Deng et al., 2009). 
Hence, in 1997, about 80% of urban housing was in the public sector (Wang,  2007). 
In 1998, an important milestone of housing reform was the issuance of the 23rd Decree 
by the State Council, which ended the policy of purchasing houses from work units (Li 
and Wu, 2013). Instead, work units would have to provide their employees with monetary 
subsidies to help them buy housing units on the market. Therefore, the majority of urban 
households were encouraged to purchase housing units from the housing market. This 
1998 reform was characterized as the monetization of the housing allocation system 
(Deng et al., 2009). Since 1998, there has been widespread housing privatization in urban 
China. This policy finally paved the way to develop a market-oriented housing market in 
China’s urban area. From 1998 to 2003, the government initiated all sorts of policies to 
stimulate housing market development. For example, the government reduced many 
house-related taxes such as sales tax and property tax (Zhang et al. , 2012). Consequently, 
the Chinese housing market experienced rapid expansion since 1998 and housing prices 
rapidly grew since 2003. Ye et al. (2006) pointed out that in China, annual investment in 
real estate averaged about RMB 746 billion
7
 from 2000 to 2004, and accounted for 
                                                             
7 As of February 2014, the U.S. dollar-Chinese RMB exchange rate was 1:6.11 (CEINET Database). To 
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almost 7% of the national GDP. With the development of the housing market, the living 
conditions of urban households have also improved significantly. For example, the per 
capita living space increased from 18.7 square meters in 1998 to 24.97 square meters in 
2004 (Deng et al., 2009). However, the government implemented policies, such as raising 
interest rates, to control housing prices from 2004 to 2008. From September of 2008 to 
2009, housing policies aimed at stimulating economic growth were implemented to ease 
the economic crisis. This caused a continuous growth in housing prices. Since 2010 until 
now, the government has been initiating policies to curb this rapid rise in housing prices.  
In April 2010, the State Council issued ‘The Notice about Curbing Rapid Rise of Housing 
Prices in Some Cities’, which proposed improving the housing supply and increasing 
indemnificatory housing construction, such as affordable housing.  
From 1978 to 1997, together with privatization, to enhance housing affordability, two 
principal policy instruments were developed (Chen et al., 2010). To accumulate the initial 
capital for workers to purchase a home, the Housing Provident Fund (HPF), based on 
Singapore’s Central Provident Fund (CPF) system, was introduced in Shanghai in 1991, 
then across all urban areas after 1994 (Chen et al., 2010). The HPF is supported by 
tax-free payroll contributions from employees, matched by those of employers, and 
provides various forms of assistance, including subsidized mortgages, in return (Chen et 
al., 2010). In addition, the “affordable housing” program was implemented to enhance 
housing affordability. In this program, supply-side subsidies are provided, which employ 
instruments such as allocating land at zero cost combined with profit caps on developers  
(Chen et al., 2010). Hence, the prices of affordable housing fall within agreed thresholds 
to prevent developers from capturing the subsidy (Chen et al., 2010). This program was 
aimed originally at households in urban areas, but its target has been narrowed to the 
middle- and low-income households since 2003 (Chen and Hao, 2007). The monetization 
reform in 1998 called for establishing a social security housing system for those who 
could not afford to purchase “affordable housing”  units or to rent market housing units 
(Deng et al., 2009). The targeted groups include people with disabilities, lonely seniors, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
convert Chinese RMB accounts to U.S. dollars, divide the RMB amount by 6.11. Thus, RMB 746 billion 
would be about 122billion U.S. dollars.  
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and lowest-income households (Deng et al., 2011). Ye et al. (2006) pointed out that rents 
in these social housing units should be heavily subsidized. In addition, the Ministry 
acknowledged that the main housing problem in China is that of urban poverty, in which 
people may not even be able to rent a house in which to live. Hence, in 2004, the Chinese 
central government implemented the “public housing/cheap-rent housing” program 
(hereafter, the “public housing” program), which employed instruments such as 
expanding the public housing supply and the demand-subsidy approach. However, 
because of the funding problems, this program has understandably grown very slowly 
(Han, 2008). Before 2006, about 550,000 lowest-income households benefited from the 
“public housing” program, which produced only about 1% of the total housing units built 
during the same period. Until 2006, some big cities, such as Beijing, officially 
implemented this program.  
After over 30 years of reform in the housing market, China now has a more-or-less 
complete policy system with multi-level housing supply, including general housing, 
affordable housing, public housing, and so on. The involved parties include the 
enterprises, consumers, socially vulnerable groups, service agencies, and the government 
(Ye et al., 2006). Hence, a housing policy is one of the most basic, yet complex policies 
that concerns everyone’s livelihood. Figure 1.5 shows the management of the multi -level 
housing system. 
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Table 1.1 The process of China’s urban housing reform  
Period Main Content 
1948–1978 
Welfare housing system (planned state-owned housing system): 
state-owned enterprises (work units) produced and allocated houses 
almost free of charge. 
1979–1985 
“Three-thirds System,” a subsidy policy for housing sales, under 
which the government work units and individual could each afford 
one third of the housing cost.  
1986–1991 
Stimulate housing purchases by increasing the rent of state-owned 
housing to the cost, including maintenance fees, management fees 
and depreciation charges. 
1991–1994 
Co-existing of the rent and the sales of state-owned housing units, 
expanded the form of housing investment, and established HPF 
program. 
1994–1998 
Prioritized selling state-owned housing units; established a 
multi-level housing supply system, including the affordable housing 
program. 
The second half 
of 1998 
Ended the old housing allocation system; set up the policies of 
privatization and monetization; proposed a multi-level urban housing 
supply system and housing security system. 
2003–Present 
Adjusted the housing supply structure, enabling most families to 
purchase or lease commodity housing units in the free market 
(affordable housing program and public/cheap-rent housing program). 
Source and notes: Wang (2012); periods from 1949 to 1978 are summarized by author.  
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Figure 1.5 The management of the multi-level housing system in China. 
Source and notes: Summarized by author; 
*
MOHURD: Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development of the People’s Republic of China; 
+
READ: Real Estate Administration 
Department; 
-
PHMD: Public Housing Management Department; 
#
DCAH: The Department in 
Charge of Affordable Housing. 
1.3.2 Relationship between house and land 
Housing and land prices are closely related. According to the Ricardian rent theory 
(Ricardo, 1911), the demand for land is derived from the housing demand in a city. If the 
land market is efficient, land prices are determined primarily by property prices. In 
contrast, neoclassical rent theory states that a product’s price is determined by its costs 
(Needham, 1981). Since land costs are the main component of housing prices, rising land 
prices will increase the long-run supply costs of housing, thus pushing up housing prices 
(Bostic et al., 2007; Potepan, 1996).  
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Especially in China’s case, governments were essentially the only land supplier after 
2004, enabling them to control land prices by arbitrarily controlling land supply (Du et al., 
2011). In addition, a new land granting system, discussed in the next section, has greatly 
changed the land price formation mechanism, as well as the dynamic relationship 
between land and housing prices in China (Du et al., 2011). In China, the relationship 
between housing and land become stronger, a trend already analyzed by many researchers, 
including Wen and Goodman (2013), Zhang et al. (2013), Du et al. (2011), and Wu et al. 
(2012). Zhang (2008) points out that the land supply policy implemented by the 
government had a significant impact on housing prices. Furthermore, by using panel data 
from four cities
8
 in vector error correction models, Du et al. (2011) examined the impact 
of land policy on housing prices, and found that there exists a long-run equilibrium 
between the Chinese urban housing and land markets. In other words, land prices are the 
Granger causes of housing prices, while the reverse does not exist. In addition, they also 
show that the housing and land markets became less efficient since adopting the new land 
granting system in 2004, as housing and land markets responded to market disequilibrium 
more slowly than before. However, Wen and Goodman (2013) pointed out that the impact 
of housing prices on land prices is almost the same or greater than the impact of land 
prices on housing prices. To examine the interact effects between land prices and housing 
prices, they apply a simultaneous-equations model with sample data from 21 provincial 
cities from 2000 to 2005. They assume that housing prices and land prices have an 
endogenous interrelationship, and their results show that housing prices have a greater 
influence on land prices. In addition, Zhang et al. (2013) examined the effect of land use 
control
9
 on housing prices. They apply the production model of three sectors (housing, 
agriculture, and others) to analyze the effects of an artificial constraint on land use. Their 
results argue that the policy of restricting land use causes high housing prices. 
Furthermore, Wu et al. (2012) suggested that much of the housing price increase in large 
Chinese cities (especially in Beijing) in recent years is driven by the increase in land 
values. Based on these previous studies, there exists a strong relationship between the 
                                                             
8 The four cities are Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing (Du et al., 2011).   
9 Land use control includes the policy of restricting land use, in particular, the maintenance of a minimum 
overall agricultural acreage (Zhang et al., 2013).  
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housing and land markets. Hence, the next section discusses China’s land policy.  
1.3.3 China’s land policy 
China’s land does not exist private ownership. On December 4, 1982, the Chinese 
Communist Party amended the “Constitution,” in which Article 10 stipulated that all land 
is only belong to the collectives or state, and the ownership of land is managed under a 
system of central control. Hence, the Chinese government owns the rights to controlling 
and using the land. The local governments are the agents of the country (Deng et al., 
2009). Therefore, they take charge of expropriating rural land use for urban use and 
allocating it among users (Deng et al., 2009). Subject to the requirements of the central 
government, local governments can decide what can be built in their jurisdiction by 
controlling both the land supply and the zoning regulations (Deng et al., 2009). For 
instance, the China’s Premier Wen Jiabao (2002–2012) made it clear that a minimum 
acreage of 1.8 billion mu (120 million ha) for agricultural use must be maintained . Apart 
from limiting the total amount of land for non-agricultural use, the Chinese government 
has, over time, developed a system for managing urban land use.  
China’s land policy comprises two components. One is the land reserve system, and the 
other one is the granting system of land use rights (Du et al., 2011). Over the last three 
decades, the two systems have experienced great changes with profound implications for 
China’s housing market. This section reviews the evolution of the land policy and land 
market. 
The land reserve system was set at the national level on April 30, 2001, at which time 
“A Notice on Strengthening State-Owned Land Management” was also published by the 
Chinese State Council. On November 19, 2007, the “Land Reserve Regulation” was 
officially taken effect, which indicated a fully developed land reserve system in China. 
The urban land reserve system is the system that the land use rights are recycled from the 
existing land owners by municipal governments through kinds of market -oriented 
methods, such as repurchase, exchanges and acquisitions (Du et al., 2011). Then, the 
previous development tasks on land are completed by the governments, after which they 
can put land back on the market on the basis of the land use and its developing plan. 
15 
 
Under Chinese land reserve system, the municipal governments are able to monopolize 
the primary land market. As a result, in the secondary land market, the traded quantity of 
land use rights is reduced. Therefore, the urban land supply is completely controlled by 
Chinese municipal governments. 
There are three major policy periods in the evolution of the Chinese land use rights 
granting system: the period from 1982 to 1988, the period from 1988 to 2001, and the 
period from 2002 onwards. During the first period, the land demanders, such as 
individuals, organizations, and companies, only could acquire land use rights that cannot 
be transferred under the allocation system of plan-oriented. The government controlled 
the land quantity and the timing of the development, thus monopolizing the land market 
under this policy. In addition, the governments proposed that the maximum durations of 
land use rights should be difference relying on the purpose and type of land usage. For 
example, the period was70 years for residential use, 50 years for industrial use, and 40 
years for commercial use. 
The Article 10 of the “Constitution Amendment Act” on April 12, 1988 stated that land 
use rights might be transferred on the basis of the law. To be transferable, in the primary 
land market, the land use rights should be separated from its ownership (Du et al., 2011). 
To obtain land use rights, there are two main ways as follows. First, land use rights could 
be negotiated with a municipal government, with an agreement that included a substantial 
granting fee payable in full and upfront. Alternatively, the existing use rights owners, 
who were state-owned or collective-owned enterprises, could sell land use rights in the 
land secondary market. Under the circumstances, the sellers and purchasers could get a 
negotiate price of land. The negotiate system refers to that demanders could negotiate 
land price with either state-owned firms or the governments. Because of the barriers in 
negotiating with the local government, the other land demanders, such as private-owned 
enterprises, who wanted to enter China’s housing market, faced several difficulties.  
However, other land developers, especially private-owned enterprises and foreign 
entities, faced serious difficulties entering China’s housing market, mainly owing to 
various barriers in dealing with local governments. Although Chinese land reserve system 
did not fully develop, from 1988 to 2001, numerous land rights were still traded in the 
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market, and especially in the secondary market, most of the land demand could be 
satisfied. As a result, during this period, urban land prices were dominated by the land 
transaction in the secondary market, which reflected the land demand and supply, as 
pointed out by Peng and Thibodeau (2012).  
As a result of the lack of transparency in the land trade before 2002, governments lost 
revenue from land transactions (Du et al., 2011). To promote transparency, on July 1, 
2002, China’s Ministry of Land and Resources began to implement a new land policy 
regarding the three main methods of granting land use rights: invitation to tender, 
auctions, and listings
10
. By August 31, 2004, this policy was fully implemented. Under 
this policy, land developers could obtain land use rights from a fair competition market, 
and entering China’s real estate market become easier. Hence, these  policies bring more 
transparency to the land market and lower the entry threshold (Du et al., 2011). This 
granting method was completely adopted in 2004, which was a major milestone in the 
development of China’s real estate market. First of all, the total  number of real estate 
developers increased dramatically from 37,123 in 2003 to 59,242 in 2004 (Du et al., 
2011). Secondly, land developers were more diverse than before. For example, in 2004, 
the number of investment developers from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, as well as 
foreign and foreign investment developers increased by 79.25%. Hence, after the 
complete adoption of this land policy, China’s land market structure improved 
significantly. 
1.4 Problems with China’s housing market 
1.4.1 China’s housing market development since 1995 
After the enactment of “The Decision of Deepening the Reform of the Urban Housing 
                                                             
10 Here, the three new granting methods are introduced in compliance with the study by Du et al . (2011). 
“Invitation to tender” – after the public announcements of the local governments, the invited organizations 
or individuals will bid a price on a given land. Based on the bidding results, land use rights are granted.  
“Auctions” – after the local governments’ announcements, bidders can participate in the auction at a 
given time and place. Prices are publicly quoted by bidders. The bidder who quotes the highest price could 
get the land use right.  
“Listings” – local governments place a notice at the given location of land exchange. The terms and 
conditions must be opened by the grantor for the granting of land use rights. As soon as the bidder’s 
quotations are accepted, the listed notice is updated accordingly. The granting of land use right is 
determined by the quotation with no less than 10 working days.  
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System” in 1994, some cities began to sell houses in the market. In July 1998, China’s 
housing market started the monetization reform officially (Zhang et al. 2012).  
A dramatic increase in residential selling prices accompanied housing policy reforms. 
In 1995, the residential selling price was RMB1710 per square meter. This value reached 
6237.3 in 2013. Figure 1.6 shows the trend of residential selling price since 1995. From 
1995 to 1997, residential selling price was under RMB 2000 per square meter and this 
trend was almost consistent. Although housing commercialization reform was 
implemented gradually during this period, the housing policy of physical distribution was 
also operational. As a result, the residential selling price did not change greatly. However, 
the comprehensive implementation of housing monetization reform caused rapid increase 
in residential selling price. Prices rapidly increased from 2001 until 2013, with a period 
of brief price drop in 2008. Increase in interest rate on loans from 6.12% to 7.47% by the 
state to control housing prices might have caused this price decrease. 
 
Figure 1.6 Trend in housing selling price since 1995 
Source: China Premium Database in the CEIC Database 
With an increase in housing price, more and more households could not afford housing 
units by themselves (Liu et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010). Deng et al (2009) pointed out to 
improve housing affordability for its citizen, affordable housing program and public 
housing program are the two main housing policies in China’s current housing market 
18 
 
(See Section 1.3.1).  
To assist these middle- and low-income households own houses, the Chinese 
government implemented the affordable housing program which was first proposed in 
June 1994. In 1997, per meter price of affordable and residential housing were RMB 1097 
and RMB 1790, respectively. With increasing residential housing price, affordable 
housing price also increased year over year (see Figure 1.7). Affordable housing price 
stood at RMB 2495 per square meter in 2010, recording an increase of 127.44% 
compared to 1997 prices. This growth was primarily led by the high growth rate of 
residential housing price, which recorded an increase of 163.97% over 1997 prices. 
However, the price ratio of affordable housing to residential housing dropped from 0.61 
in 1997 to 0.53 in 2010. The lowest price ratio of 0.48 was recorded in 2009. Therefore, it 
can be observed that although residential housing prices influence affordable housing 
prices, the latter increases at a relatively slower rate than the former. Moreover, the 
declining price ratio shows that the price of affordable housing is comparatively 
reasonable.  
 
Figure 1.7 Residential and affordable selling prices, 1997–2010 
Source: China Premium Database in CEIC Database. 
Although the affordable housing program was proposed in 1994, construction 
progressed at a slow speed from 1994 to 1995. Since 1996, other cities , such as Beijing 
and Zhengzhou, began construction of affordable houses. Floor spaces of the newly 
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started, under construction and completed affordable and unaffordable housing are shown 
in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.2 Floor spaces of newly started, under construction and completed 
affordable and unaffordable housing 
 
Source: All data are from the China Premium Database in the CEIC Database. 
Notes: Measurement units of the values are thousand square meters. The numbers in 
parentheses denote the ratio of affordable housing construction to residential housing 
construction. The data on newly-started, under construction, and completed unaffordable 
housing floor spaces are derived by subtracting the corresponding values for affordable 
housing from that of residential housing. 
From 1996 to 2001, the construction of affordable houses increased every year. The 
proportion of affordable housing construction to residential housing construction reached 
peak values in the year 2000. Especially, the ratio of completed floor spaces in affordable 
houses to that of residential housing reached 26.07% in 2000. Nevertheless, in 2002, the 
construction of affordable houses began to decrease because of the following reasons: 
first, affordable housing sales from 1997 to 2001 did not satisfy the real estate developers. 
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During this period, the gap between selling prices of affordable and unaffordable housing 
units was not very evident (see Figure 1.5). The average proportion of selling areas was 
only 65.56%. Second, the growth rate in price for residential housing reached 4.9% in 
2000, the highest value since 1997. To earn more profits, real estate developers decreased 
construction of affordable houses. In 2003, the Ministry of Construction claimed that the 
floor space available per affordable house was too large in several cities (e.g., Beijing) in 
the report “Chinese Affordable Housing Investigation and Analysis in 2003.”11 Thus, the 
proportion of floor spaces in newly started affordable houses dropped to only 9.37% in 
2004. From then onwards until 2010, investments in affordable housing construction 
reduced year over year. 
There is little official data about the development of the public housing program. 
According to related studies (Huang, 2012; Yao and Gu, 2011), by 2006, 145 of 657 cities 
had yet to establish this system. By the end of the same year, only 0.55 million units of 
public housing had been provided, while there were four million households with a 
“Certification of Minimum Subsistence Security for Urban Residence” 12  who faced 
housing difficulties (Huang, 2012). In 2007, the public housing program managed to 
reach 0.95 million households. As of November 2009, the program included 5.65 million 
households (3.28% of urban households), of which the governments provided 2.73 
million units of public housing, as well as cash subsidies for 2.92 million households. 
According to the 2010 census data, 2.7% of all urban households lived in public housing 
units. In total, from 2009 to 2011, about 4.35 million units of public houses were 
constructed.  
Table 1.3 The cumulative number of public housing units constructed (Unit: million)  
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Public housing  0.55  0.95  4.07  4.67  5.80
*
 
Source and notes: Studies by Huang (2012).
*
The housing units of 5.80 million include public 
                                                             
11 See the following link: http://wenku.baidu.com/view/9e6c53ce05087632311212de.html  (accessed on 15 
August 2013). 
12 This is a certification to the low priority given to low-income housing in the first few years of the 21st 
century. 
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housing, affordable housing, and rebuilt shanty areas.  
1.4.2 The current problems 
According to the study by Ye et al. (2006), China’s current housing market can be divided 
into three main parts based on different beneficiaries: a general housing market, an 
affordable housing market, and a public housing market. This section illustrates the 
problems faced by each of the three markets. 
In the general housing market, house prices increased rapidly after 2003 (Ren et al., 
2012). The result was a large-scale housing “price bubble,” as shown in studies by Barth 
et al. (2012), Dreger and Zhang (2013), and Vega (2010). This was the motivation for the 
interest in the determinants of housing prices in this research. As an important policy to 
improve citizens’ ability to buy houses, the affordable housing program was implemented 
officially in 1997. As Table 1.1 shows, affordable housing construction has decreased 
since around 2001, and the ratio of affordable to unaffordable housing construction 
decreased year by year from 2001 to 2010. Huang (2013) argued that the lack of 
affordable housing threatens China’s urban dream. Comparing the construction between 
affordable and unaffordable housing, it could be supposed that there exist crowding-out 
effects between their constructions.  
To complete the housing market for those in poverty, the government officially started 
the public housing program in 2006. As a result of the late start, there is little official 
statistical data available for the public housing market. Therefore, we investigated the 
public housing market in Baoji in 2010, one of the biggest cities in the northwest that had 
implemented this program well. The problem we identified was that despite a lack of 
public housing stock (Huang, 2012), the local government was selling public housing 
units to the lowest-income households; such sales were supposed to be a subsidy 
approach. However, there is some controversy about this subsidy approach. Thus, this 
research evaluates the approach using utility functions. 
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Table 1.4 Types and problems of China’s housing markets 
  Providers Type Target group Main problems 
General 
housing 
market 
Real 
enterprises, 
individuals, 
social 
organizations 
Villa, senior 
apartment, 
common 
residence, 
etc. 
High- and 
middle- income 
households 
Rapid growth of 
housing price; 
housing “price 
bubble” (Ren et al., 
2012; Barth et al., 
2012; Dreger and 
Zhang, 2013) 
Affordable 
housing 
market 
(started in 
1997) 
Real 
enterprises 
subsidized by 
the 
governments 
Affordable 
housing 
Middle- and 
low-income 
households 
Affordable housing 
construction 
decreased year by 
year (Huang, 2013) 
Public 
housing 
market 
(started in 
2006) 
Government 
Public 
housing 
lowest-income 
households 
Shortage of public 
housing stock; local 
government sells 
them to households 
(Huang, 2012; Yao 
and Gu, 2011) 
Source: Summarized by author from related literature.  
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Chapter 2 
Macroeconomic Determinants of House Prices in China 
Significant increase in the price of housing in China has received considerable 
attention in recent years. House prices significantly influence economic activity 
and financial stability, hence estimating the determinants is very important. House 
prices generally depend on fundamental factors affecting supply and demand of 
houses. Using the data from 30 provinces and cities from 2002:Q1 to 2012:Q4, 
Chapter 2 applies the fixed effect model to examine the key factors affecting house 
prices. In fact, the empirical results indicate that land price and disposable income 
have significant roles in pushing up house prices; a higher amount of 
newly-started housing floor spaces and increased mortgage rate would apparently 
push house prices down; the enactment of “Property Law” and the raising of the 
minimum down payment ratio affect changes in house prices negatively.  
2.1 Introduction 
The determinants of house prices in China have attracted much attention recently, due to 
the high growth rate of house prices. Over the past two decades, China’s house prices 
have risen rapidly. Ren et al. (2012) pointed out that from 2003 to 2007, house price 
growth rate reached as high as 14% per year on average; while in some big cities, such as 
Beijing, an annual increase of 22% was reported. As a result , there has been widespread 
concern that the rapid increase in China’s housing values marks the existence of “price 
bubble” that will inevitably burst. This fear stems from the collapse that  occurred in 
Japan beginning in the early 1990s (Barth et al, 2012; Dreger and Zhang, 2013). Vega 
(2010) even argued that China’s housing “price bubble” is more serious than the run-up 
and subsequent crash of US. house prices, which led to the subprime crisis in 2007. 
Housing market and economic activity have a strong link (Vargas-Silva, 2008), and the 
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study by McDonald and Stock (2013) agreed that the bursting of the housing “price 
bubble” leads to the financial crisis and deep recession of 2007 to 2009  in the US. Hence, 
China’s administrators began to be concerned about the potential risks of a bubble -burst 
in the housing market, which then prompted them to take a number of actions to control 
the high house price increase. For the past few years, the government has already adopted 
several policy packages for this purpose, e.g. raising the minimum ratio of credit down 
payment, and “Five National Regulations” on housing markets. Given this, it is crucial 
for the Chinese government to thoroughly analyze the main macroeconomic determinants 
of house prices, which, in turn, would lead to the understanding of the effects of related 
policies on the housing market at large. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter assesses the impacts of the main macroeconomic 
determinants on real house price growth. The determinants of house prices include factors 
that drive demand and supply for housing. The major drivers of housing demand are 
disposable income, GDP, population, urbanization, user costs, availability of mortgage 
financing, interest rates, and house price growth expectations; while the major drivers of 
housing supply include land prices, housing stocks, construction costs, central-local fiscal 
relations, and the availability of financing (Pan and Wang, 2013; Ahuja et al., 2010). 
However, housing has unique characteristics and the supply side of the real estate market 
is more rigid due to the shortage of land for housing construction and the time needed for 
completing new construction (Stepanyan et al., 2010). Therefore, most empirical studied 
on house price determinants focus on the demand side, such as Apergis et al. (2013), 
Calomiris et al. (2013), and Pan and Wang (2013). However, in China’s case, because of 
land use control
13
, land price is the most important factor determining house prices. The 
effect of land prices on house prices was enhanced after the adoption of the new granting 
system for land use rights in 2002 (Deng et al., 2009). Hence, determining factors from 
both demand and supply sides is a key to understanding housing price increases in China. 
Actually many studies have investigated the nature and determinants of house prices in 
China by attempting to consider this, such as Deng et al. (2009), Hua et al. (2012), and 
                                                             
13 Land use control refers to the fact that the government, possessor of the land, implements policies for the 
restriction of land uses, in particular the maintenance of a minimum overall agricultural acreage (Zhang et 
al., 2013). 
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Zhang et al. (2012). The main macroeconomic factors they applied are land price, GDP 
per capita, household disposable income, population, CPI inflation, user costs
14
, 
newly-build supply, housing units sold, unemployment, mortgage rate, broad monetary 
aggregate, exchange rate, hot money, etc. However, these papers suffer from a limitation 
that they did not focus on related policies enacted to suppress house prices.  However, 
Zhang et al. (2012) did suggest that dramatic tightening measures such as down payment 
ratio, transaction tax or administrative matters also play important roles in housing price 
dynamics. Hence, assessing these policies’ effects on house prices is necessary. In 
addition, because of the statistical approach of house price index change in 2010, the 
sample periods of these previous studies ended on or before 2010. Since 2010, with the 
increased development of the housing market and policies related to this, such as 
monetary policy (Fernald et al., 2014), it is crucial to extend the sample period. 
This chapter attempts to fill in the two gaps, policy and sample period, and will 
complement the literature by identifying important determinants of house prices in China 
with panel data over the period 2002:Q1 to 2012:Q4. We not only use the basic factors 
that drive house price fluctuations, but also use policy dummy variables. We will 
introduce, in addition to the traditional triggers of real house prices, such as real land 
price, disposable income, and mortgage rate, etc., two main policies are considered, 
which demonstrate the effects of the enactment of the “Property Act”15 in March, 2007 
and the “China Banking Regulatory Commission’s Notification of Improvement of the 
Real Estate Credit”16 in September of 200717. The two policies were enacted to suppress 
house prices. The main objectives here are to assess quantitatively whether the 
conventional fundamental factors of house prices, in conjunction with related policies, 
                                                             
14 Here, user costs refer to the consumers’ costs of owning houses, which include the mortgage interest, 
maintenance cost, and property tax, e.g. (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008). 
15 The “Property Act” proposed that that the property tax should be levied to suppress the speculative 
demand of houses. 
16 In this notification, the minimum down payment ratio for credit was improved, e.g. this ratio for those 
who buy a second residential house is 40%, but only 20% or 30%for those who buy a first house; if the floor 
spaces of a first house are no more than 90 square meters, the ratio is 20%; otherwise, it is 30%. 
17 The reason why we consider the two policies are the following:  first, the background of the policy 
implementation is that house price growth rate reached as high as 14% per year on average (2012); second, 
“Property Act” presented that although the durable years of residential land go to an end, households could 
continue to use them, which stable the real estate market; “Property Act” also lay a good foundation for 
levying property tax, which aims to control speculative housing demand; third, as shown in footnote 16, the 
related policy of down payment ratio in the “Notification”  also play an important role in controlling 
speculative housing demand. 
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play an important role in the observed house price dynamics. The following three main 
questions are answered: What are the main factors that push real house prices up? What 
are the main factors that push house prices down? Were the two main policies effective in 
suppressing the growth of real house prices? 
The remainder of this chapter is organized into five sections. Section 2.2 summarizes 
the previous studies and existing explanations for China’s housing market. Section 2.3 
describes the data and methodology. In section 2.4, we report the empirical results. 
Section 2.5 concludes with the main findings of this chapter. Then, section 2.6 illustrates 
the housing affordability in China’s housing market.  
2.2 Literature review 
Many researchers have explored the determinants of house prices. Algieri (2013) pointed 
out that as durable goods, houses have long average lives and construction processes can 
be drawn out due to things like slow administrative procedures and cumbersome building 
regulations. This implies that housing supply is relatively rigid in the short term. The 
existence of supply-side constraints and other market imperfections make house prices , in 
short run, chiefly demand driven (Algieri, 2013). In the majority of previous studies, the 
relevance of income and interest rates are confirmed as house price drivers (Vizek, 2010). 
Other important factors driving housing demand are population growth, unemployment, 
inflation, credit availability, and household wealth. Iossifov et al. (2008) analyzed 
residential prices in Asia and 20 advanced countries in Western Europe from 1980 to 
2007. They employed real per capita GDP, population, unemployment, interest rates, 
primary fiscal balance, current accounts and financial deepening as the determinants of 
house prices. Their results showed that, their sample countries’ house prices are aligned 
with these fundamentals, and the most important one is the short-run real interest rate, 
with house price elasticity of -3.6. A higher elasticity was found in the study by Gattini 
and Hiebert (2010) with the Johansen procedure, and a study by Ayuso et al. (2006) using 
the error correction model (ECM) models. In the US housing market, Pan and Wang 
(2013) applied the dynamic panel models with quarterly data over 1990:Q2 to 2010:Q4 to 
analyze this problem. Their results showed that the income elasticity of house prices 
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(which is 0.57) is larger than labor growth elasticity of house prices (0.08). However, 
another study by Schnure (2005) found an opposite result that labor force elasticity is 
larger than real income elasticity in the US housing market. Besides, Schnure (2005) 
found that the negative effect of unemployment is stronger than that of real interest rate.  
Recently research has begun to analyze house prices’ determinants from both the 
demand and the supply side. Algieri (2013) analyzed the fundamental determinants of 
house prices in five main European countries and two Anglo-Saxon economies
18
 by 
applying the annual data from 1970 to 2010 to unobserved components model. The results 
show that for the sample countries, real disposable income, inflation rate and population 
growth are the main factors that drive up house prices, and that residential investment and 
long-term interest rate negatively affect changes in house prices. Besides, the magnitudes 
of population growth and real investment elasticity are highest and lowest respectively. 
There are similar situations in OECD countries’ housing markets. Study by Caldera and 
Johansson (2013) showed that the magnitude of population elasticity of real house prices 
is largest, and that of dwelling stock elasticity of real house prices is lowest. Other related 
research about OECD countries by Madsen (2012) found that income and mortgage rate 
are the main factors that increase and decrease house prices. In addition , Adams and Füss 
(2010) examined the long-term impact and short-term dynamics of macroeconomic 
variables on international housing prices. Their empirical results indicate that house 
prices increase in the long-term by 0.6% in response to a 1% increase in economic 
activity, while construction costs and long-term interest rates show average long-term 
effects of approximately 0.6% and -0.3% respectively. In the study by Gattini and Hiebert 
(2010), mixed interest rate elasticity of house prices is -6.87. Also, real house investment 
elasticity of house prices is -2.2 in the same research. However, there are other studies 
that prove a positive relationship between house prices and housing investment. In the 
investigating of the behavior of private residential investments of the six largest 
European economies, Gattini and Ganoulis (2012) pointed out that in France, Germany and 
Spain, the land price proxy is an important factor in driving investment decisions.  The 
                                                             
18 The five main Euro area countries are Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands; the 
Anglo-Saxon economies are the United Kingdom and the United States.  
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investments tend to react positively to shocks in the cost of production, e.g. raw material, 
transport, and labor costs. This result is also supported by Égertand Mihaljek (2007), who 
point out that the material costs and real costs of construction affect house price 
positively. Their results reflect that in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, 
construction costs influence real residential investment positively at statistical ly 
significant level. From this point of view, house investments may be seen as a proxy of 
costs. Therefore, in this situation house investments affect house prices positively. 
In China’s housing market, Ren et al. (2012) pointed out that to explore the 
mechanisms behind the rapid increase of house prices further, one must to carefully 
examine both demand and supply side. Zhang et al. (2012) explored the determinants of 
China’s housing prices by using monthly data from 1999:01 to 2010:06. In paying main 
attention on the effects of monetary policies, their results mainly identify mortgage rate, 
real effective exchange rate, and broad money supply as the key monetary variables in 
interpreting house price dynamics. Zhang et al. (2012) also pointed out that local 
fundamentals affect the local house prices, and Ren et al. (2012) stated that house capital 
flows freely across different regions. Incorporating these two points, eliminates any 
influence of the local economy on house prices requires China researchers to use panel 
data. Deng et al. (2009) used the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model to investigate 
the dynamic effects of significant factors on China’s housing prices. The fundamental 
factors applied to explain house price variations are land prices, newly-started supply, 
household disposable income, unemployment, and housing units sold. Their results show 
that among these factors, the most important is land price. Hua et al. (2012) also used 
panel data of 12 major cities in China during the period from 1999 to 2012 to analyze the 
determinants of house prices, and find that land price and user costs have the greatest 
impacts on house prices. 
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2.3 Data and methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
We decide to use panel data in this chapter. Because of the data availability, our samples 
include 30 provinces and cities
19
 in China. Data for our samples starts from 2002:Q1 and 
extends to 2012:Q4. Following the studies by Algieri (2013), Deng et al. (2009), Pan and 
Wang (2013), and Caldera and Johansson (2013), we are going to apply nine series 
variables, i.e. real house prices
20
 (denoted by hp ), real land prices 21  ( lp ), real 
disposable income (per capita) ( inc ), real estate investment ( inve ), employment growth 
rate ( em ), inflation rate 22  ( infl ),newly-started housing floor spaces ( nstart ),stock 
market return ( glsp ) and nominal average mortgage rate ( mrm ). The nominal average 
mortgage rate is calculated by averaging the mortgage rates of less than 5 years and that 
of over 5 years. The variables of glsp  and mrm  are two common variables. All series 
are sampled at a quarterly frequency and seasonally adjusted when appropriate. The 
source of house and land prices and disposable income is from the database of China 
Economic Information net. All the other data are taken from the CEIC database. Real 
values have been obtained from the corresponding nominal quantities using the CPI index 
as deflator. The logarithms of the variables, hp , lp , inc , inve , and nstart , are 
denoted as lhp , llp , linc , linve , and lnstart  respectively. 
Detailed explanations of the above variables are shown in Table 2.1. From this table, 
we can see the expected effect of these variables on house prices, the explanat ions for this, 
and related research. In the study by Deng et al. (2009), land price is the most important 
factor to explain house price in China. The variable lp  is expected to be positively 
related to house prices. We use real estate investment as the proxy for construction cost
23
. 
                                                             
19 All these provinces and cities are Anhui (AH), Beijing (BJ), Chongqing (CQ), Fujian (FJ), Guangdong 
(GD), Gansu (GS), Guangxi(GX), Guizhou (GZ), Hainan(HN), Hebei (HEB), Henan (HEN), Heilongjiang 
(HLJ), Hubei (HUB), Hunan (HUN), Inner Mongolia (INM), Jilin (JL), Jiangsu (JS ), Jiangxi (JX), Liaoning 
(LN), Ningxia (NX), Qinghai (QH), Sichuan (SC), Shandong (SD), Shanghai (SH), Shaanxi (SHAX), 
Shanxi (SX), Tianjin (TJ), Xinjiang (XJ), Yunnan (YN), and Zhejiang (ZJ).  
20 Here, real house prices do not include real land prices, which mean that real land prices can be clearly 
separated from real house prices.  
21 Land prices equal to the land transaction fees divided by land areas purchased. Data of land transaction 
fees and land areas purchased are collected from the China Economic Information net. 
22 Inflation rates have been computed from CPI rate. 
23 Another reason why we use real estate as the proxy of construction cost is that there is no direct data to 
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In our case, real estate investment refers to the sum of costs and investments on housing 
construction, land development, public construction, and other associated costs. The 
material costs and real construction costs affect house price positively (Égert and 
Mihaljek, 2007). Hence, the expected effect of real estate investment on house price is 
positive. Real disposable income is the proxy for the wealth of household. The variable 
inc  is positively related with house prices due to growing income improves housing 
affordability, which creates more housing demand, which drives up house prices. Higher 
inflation ( infl ) expectation is likely to be related with increasing housing demand, a 
shelter against inflation, which indicates an increasing of house prices. Higher 
employment growth rate should increase disposable income and housing demand, which 
drive up house price. Hence, expected effect of em  is positive. Newly-started housing 
floor space has been used as a proxy of housing supply. More housing supply pushes the 
supply curve outside, hence house price decreases. Therefore, the variable nstart   
affect house prices negatively. The relationship between stock market return and house 
prices could be negative or positive, because the stocks have wealth effect or substitution 
effect on houses. If houses are seemed as investment goods, stocks have the substation 
effect. The higher the return in one market, the lower the investment in the other market. 
Therefore, the relationship between stock and housing markets is negative. Conversely, if 
houses are seemed as consumer goods, stocks will express the wealth effect. The higher 
return of stock market indicates the raising wealth of  investors (Koivu, 2012). Hence, the 
housing affordability and demand are improved. This indicates a positive relationship 
between housing and stock market. Nominal mortgage rate is used as a proxy of financing 
cost. Since the main financial source of buying houses is borrowing money from banks, a 
higher mortgage rate will increase the user (consumer) costs, and thus push house prices 
down. Nominal mortgage rate is used as a proxy for the cost of mortgage financing. As 
houses are predominantly financed by borrowing, higher nominal mortgage rates increase 
the cost of homeownership and push prices down. In other words, the expected 
relationship between changes in nominal mortgage rate and real house prices are 
negative.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
proxy the construction cost in China. 
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Table 2.1 Independent variables used in our research 
Fundamentals 
Effect on 
house prices Explanation 
Literature and their 
results 
Real land price positive 
supply side: proxy for the costs 
of real estate enterprises  Zhang et al.(2012)+ 
Real estate 
investment positive 
supply side: proxy for the 
construction cost 
Gattini and Ganoulis 
(2012)+, Égert and 
Mihaljek (2007)+;  
Real disposable 
income positive 
demand side: proxy for the 
wealth of households, making 
housing more affordable to 
population 
Algieri(2013)+; Pan 
and Wang (2013)+; 
Madsen (2012)+; 
Gattini and 
Hiebert(2010)+ 
Inflation positive 
demand side: proxy for the 
alternative investments and 
capital gains from houses 
Zhang et al. (2012)+; 
as a proxy of 
inflation: 
Algieri(2013)+ 
Employment positive 
demand side: proxy for 
increasing demand of houses 
Pan and Wang 
(2013)+; Calomiris et 
al. (2013)+ 
Newly-started 
floor space negative 
supply side: proxy for the stock 
of houses  
OECD (2005)-; 
McCarthy and 
Peach(2004)- 
Stock market 
return 
positive or 
negative 
supply and demand sides: proxy 
for substitution effect (-); proxy 
for wealth effect (+)  
Algieri(2013)+;Sutto
n (2002)+; Ayuso et 
al. (2006)- 
Mortgage rate negative 
demand side: proxy for user 
costs 
Zhang et al. (2012)-; 
Madsen (2012)- 
Source: Summarized from related literatures. 
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In addition, we are going to use two policy dummy variables which demonstrate the 
enactment of the “Property Act” (dum1) in March, 2007 and the “China Banking 
Regulatory Commission’s Notification of Improvement of the Real Estate Credit” (dum2) 
in September, 2007. The two policies were enacted to control house prices. Before 
enactment, the values of dummy variables were 0; after, they equaled 1. Hence, the values 
of dum1 equal 0 during the period from 2002:Q1 to 2006:Q4; they equal 1 from 2007:Q2 
to 2012:Q4. In the same way, the values of dum2 equal 0 over the period from 2002:Q1 to 
2007:Q2; they equal 1 from 2007:Q3 to 2012:Q4. After the enactments, the house prices 
were expected to decrease. Hence, the expected signs of the two dummy variables are 
negative. Table 2.2 shows us the summary statistics of the selected variables.  
Table 2.2 Summary statistics of the selected variables 
Variables Measure Observation Mean Min Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
Real house price RMB 1320 3559.35  1016.38  18730.90  2583.90  
Real land price RMB 1320 1700.55  42.65  49945.80  3402.79  
Real disposable 
income RMB 1320 8166.44  2902.50  25655.90  4071.70  
Real estate 
investment 
RMB in 
million 1320 47.50  59.00  33.00  54.00  
Floor spaces 
newly-started 
Square 
meter in 
million 1320 17.60  0.29  89.00  16.10  
2.3.2 Methodology 
The initial house prices differ across provinces and cities. The standard panel data 
specification is that there is an individual-specific effect which enters linearly in the 
regression, which is consistent with the situation in China. The basic function is 
expressed as follows: 
33 
 
it it i i itlhp X u e                             (2.1) 
where lhp  is the dependent variable, the logarithm of house price,   is the model 
parameters, i  and t  indicate the individual and time variables respectively, and X  is 
a data vector of 10 explanatory variables, i.e., 
 , , , , , , , , 1, 2X llp linve linc infl em lnstart mrm glsp dum dum . iu  shows the unobserved 
individual effect, and ite  is error term across individuals and time. We assume the 
individuals i  are mutually independent, that iu  and ite  are independent, and ite  is 
uncorrelated with itx . Table 2.3 gives us the summary statistics of the variables used in 
our model.  
The individual-effects models include the fixed effects and random effects models, in 
which the individual effects are considered fixed and different across individuals 
respectively. In other words, when iu  is correlated with itX  , we follow the convention 
and call (2.1) a fixed-effects model, and when iu  is uncorrelated with itX  , we shall call 
it a random-effects model. The main testing procedure of fixed- or random-effects model 
is suggested by Hausman (1978). The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is the estimates 
of the two models show no significant difference. Hence, if the null hypothesis is rejected, 
the fixed-effects model is chosen. Model (2.1) includes all possible combinations of the 
variables. In order to better examine the main determinants of house prices, we report t he 
estimates from 8 equations. Following previous studies, e.g. Zhang et al. (2012), Gattini 
and Ganoulis (2012), Algieri (2013), Calomiris et al. (2013), changes in real house prices 
are expected to be positively related with changes in real land prices, user costs, 
disposable incomes, inflation, and employment growth rates, which are the fundamental 
forces driving house prices up: 
( )lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,em                      (2.2) 
We are also interested in examining the fundamental factors that decrease house prices. 
From Table 2.1, newly-started floor spaces and mortgage rate affect house prices 
negatively. Stock market return may affect house prices either positively or negatively. 
The two policies that were enacted to control house prices need to be examined to see if 
they affected the house prices as expected. To check whether the other five variables 
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could influence house prices negatively or not, we add them into equation (2 .2) one by 
one: 
( , )lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,em lnstart               (2.3) 
( , , )lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,em lnstart mrm             (2.4) 
( , , , )lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,em lnstart mrm glsp          (2.5) 
( , , , , )lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,em lnstart mrm glsp dum1        (2.6) 
To check the different effects of the two policies, we then used another function,  
( , , , , 2)lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,em lnstart mrm glsp dum        (2.7) 
Depending on the results of equation (2.2) to (2.7), we drop the factor of em , hence, 
( , , , )lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,lnstart mrm glsp dum1         (2.8) 
( , , , 2)lhp f llp,linve,linc,infl,lnstart mrm glsp dum         (2.9) 
Table 2.3 Summary statistics of the variables used in the model 
Variables Observation Mean Min Max 
Std. 
Dev. 
Log of real house price (lhp) 1320 8.0035 6.9240 9.8379 0.5524 
Log of real land price (llp) 1320 6.7600 3.7531 10.8187 1.0192 
Log of real estate investment 
(linve) 
1320 23.9064 20.1875 26.5112 1.2905 
Log of real disposable income 
(linc) 
1320 8.8917 7.9733 10.1525 0.4806 
Inflation rate (infl) 1320 0.0003 -0.0278 0.0333 0.0076 
Growth rate of employment (em) 1290 0.0064 -0.0980 0.2381 0.0221 
Log of newly-started floor spaces 
(lnstart) 
1320 16.2695 12.5763 18.3083 0.9871 
Stock market return (glsp) 1290 0.0074 -0.3198 0.2981 0.1482 
Average mortgage rate (mrm) 1320 4.1505 3.6000 4.9950 0.4410 
Dummy1 (dum1) 1320 0.5227 0.0000 1.0000 0.4997 
Dummy2 (dum2) 1320 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 0.5002 
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2.4 Empirical Results 
The standard panel data model requires stationary data, which are assessed by unit root 
test. Hence, we first test the unit roots. From the Section 2.3, we know that seven 
variables are collected for all provinces and regions, which means we need to do panel 
unit root tests for the seven variables (shown in Table 2.4). Panel unit roots based on the 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (hereafter IPS) t-bar test is used for more general case when 
the errors in the univariate time-series representation are serially correlated. Demeaned 
series for each variable was carried out and the results are shown in Table 2.4
24
. The more 
general specification of the IPS t -bar test is applied here. For the other two common 
variables, glsp  and mrm  , we apply the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1979) 
(hereafter ADF) to test their stationaries. The findings presented in Table 2.4suggest that 
all of the examined variables are stationary in levels. This allows us to use the standard 
panel data model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
24 In cases where the errors in the different regressions contain a common time-specific component, IPS 
proposes the same t-bar test, but with the individual test statistics based on cross-sectional demeaned 
regressions. In our case, demeaning is more appropriate compared to many other applications of the IPS test, 
because our group of provinces and cities are regionally connected as well , and could be hit by common 
shocks. 
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Table 2.4 Unit root test 
Panel unit root test 
Variables IPS test ( -bar) 
Log of real house price ( lhp ) -2.7294*** 
Log of real land price ( llp ) -3.5107*** 
Log of real estate investment ( linve ) -2.2772*** 
Log of real disposable income ( linc ) -2.2049*** 
Inflation rate ( infl ) -7.0268*** 
Growth rate of employment ( em ) -6.7324*** 
Log of floor spaces newly-started ( lnstart ) -3.1902*** 
Unit root test for common variables 
Variables Augmented Dickey-Fuller (z-statistics) 
Stock market returns ( glsp ) -3.5260** 
Average mortgage rate ( mrm ) -2.7890** 
Note: 
***
, 
**
 refer to the significant at 0.1% and 1% respectively.  
The estimated relationship between changes in real house prices and their  determinants 
are presented in Table 2.5. The last two rows show the Hausman tests. The null 
hypothesizes are all rejected, which reveals that the fixed-effects models are appropriate. 
Real land prices are highly significant and have the expected positive sign in virtually all 
equations, indicating that changes in real land prices are strongly positively correlated 
with changes in house prices. We can conclude from all the equations that real land prices 
elasticity of real house prices varies from 0.0630 to 0.0785. Land prices capture an 
important driving force of China’s house prices. The reason is that the land monopoly has 
enabled the local governments to extract the maximum amount of revenues from land 
leases to businesses and residential land users (Zhang et al., 2012).  
Real estate investment coefficients in most cases have the expected positive sign and 
are statistically significant, indicating that increasing changes in real estate investment is 
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associated with rising changes in real house prices. Compared with real land prices, real 
estate investment elasticity of house prices is higher, varying from 0.1059 to 0.1271. One 
unit increase of real estate investment causes more than 0.10 units of increases of real 
house prices. Real estate investment may react positively to shocks in the cost of 
production, e.g. raw material, transport, and labor costs (Gattni and Ganoulis, 2012). 
With this in mind, real estate investment could be viewed as a proxy of construction costs, 
which affect changes in real house prices positively.  
Changes in real disposable income have a strong positive relationship with changes in 
real house prices in all equations. Interestingly, estimated real disposable income 
elasticity is the highest of all factors. The elasticity values vary from 0.6445 to 0.7825, 
which means that real disposable income is the most important factor driving real house 
prices up. For instance, in the equation (2.8), if disposable income increases by 1%, real 
house prices would be raised by 0.7825%. Also in France and Italy, per capita income is 
the most important factor of the observed components that increase real house prices 
(Algieri, 2013). 
Inflation rate in most equations is significant and has the expected positive sign, and 
also the second most important factor that increases real house prices. This indicates that 
higher of inflation rates is associated with increasing real house prices. Keeping other 
factors constant, a 1% increase in inflation rate causes a rise in real house prices of 
0.6169% to 0.7027%. In France, inflation rate is also the second most important factor 
driving up real house prices (Algieri, 2013).About growth rate of employment, only 
equations (2.4) and (2.5) show us that it is significant with an expected positive sign. One 
unit increase in growth rate of employment might raise real house prices by almost 0.30 
units.  
High and rising prices in China’s housing markets have attracted the attention of the 
scholars and policy-makers. From our analysis, we now know that the main factors 
driving house prices are real land price and disposable income. We would now like to 
look at the main factors that decrease house prices. Newly-started housing floor space 
shows a strong negative relationship with real house prices in all equations, indicating 
that the more changes in newly-started housing floor spaces, the lower changes in real 
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house prices. From equations (2.3) to (2.9), the coefficients of lnstart , do not show 
much change. The newly-started housing floor space elasticity of real house prices varies 
from -0.0791 to -0.0750. In the long-run, the increase in newly-started housing floor 
space pushes the supply curve outwards, which means the equilibrium price would 
decrease. In other words, more newly-started housing floor space increases the supply of 
housing units, hence affecting house prices negatively (Meen, 2002; Caldera and 
Johansson, 2013). 
Nominal mortgage rate coefficients have the expected negative sign and are 
statistically significant, indicating that increasing mortgage rate is associated with 
decreasing house price. Increase in mortgage rate is an increase in user costs, hence the 
demand of housing units decreases, which pushes demand curve inwards. In the long-run, 
the equilibrium price would decrease also. One unit increase in mortgage rate would 
decrease real house price by 0.0220 to 0.0270 units
25
. 
Stock market return coefficients in most equations are statistically significant and have  
a negative sing. Based on a previous study by Aligeri (2013), the negative relationship 
indicates that in China the substitution effect dominates the relationship between housing 
and stock markets, as a high return in one market tends to cause investors to leave the 
other market. Therefore, the high stock market return would push real house prices down. 
Stock market return elasticity of real house prices varies from -0.0716 to -0.0577, the 
magnitudes of which is less than that of newly-started housing floor space.  
We also examine the two important policies’ effects on real house prices. The estimated 
coefficients of dummy 1 show that the enactment of the “Property Act” has a strong 
negative relationship with changes in real house prices in all equations, indicating that 
after its enactment changes of real house prices tended to decrease. The “Property Act” 
hoped that when the property tax was levied, it would suppress the speculative demand of 
houses. As a result, after the enactment, changes in house prices are definitely decreased 
by about 0.08.  
                                                             
25 Klyuev (2008) pointed out that in the U.S., real mortgage rate elasticity of house prices varies from -0.02 
to -0.04. 
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With the enactment of “China Banking Regulatory Commission’s Notification of 
Improvement of the Real Estate Credit ,” decreases in changes of real house prices were 
seen as well, as shown in equations (2.7) and (2.9). This notification increased the 
minimum down payment ratio for credit to prevent from speculation. Therefore, after the 
enactment, changes in house prices decreased by 0.0641 to 0.0665.These results are 
different from a study by Zhang et al. (2012), who revealed that the intervention policies, 
such as down payment ratio, are not effective in controlling house prices. The results of 
the two policies indicate that the act and notification play important roles in suppress ing 
the high growth of house prices, which was in line with the targets of the regulators. 
Table 2.5 Estimation results of fixed-effects models – Dependent variable logarithm 
of house prices (lhp) 
 
Note: 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 refer to the significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
Real house prices in China have seen an extraordinary rapid increase in recent years. For 
this reason, this chapter has analyzed the main macroeconomic factors that drive real 
house price fluctuations by using panel data from 30 provinces and cities over  the period 
from 2002:Q1 to 2012:Q4 in China. Although previous studies have considered land 
prices, per capita disposable income, and mortgage rate, etc. as the main determinants of 
price behavior, this chapter adds two main policy dummy variables to the model. From 
the empirical results, we summarize the main conclusions as follows. 
Because the coefficients of real disposable income and real land prices are significant 
in all cases, we conclude that they are the two main factors which push real house prices 
up. The magnitudes of the factors that push real house prices show differences. Real 
disposable income has largest magnitude that affects real house prices. Real land prices 
have the smallest magnitude in influencing of real house prices. In a similar fashion, the 
volume of newly-started housing floor space and increasing mortgage rate decrease real 
house prices. The magnitude of newly-started housing floor space on real house prices is 
the highest, while that of mortgage rate is the smallest. The enactment of the “Property 
Act” and the “China Banking Regulatory Commission’s Notification of Improvement of 
the Real Estate Credit” also affected real housing prices negatively.  
The results of our analysis suggest that it remains crucial for regulators to carefully 
monitor the housing market, given the impact of housing price on economic activity. To 
restrain the high growth of house prices, regulators should supply more land and 
encourage real estate enterprises to start more housing floor spaces. Besides, the 
government could implement appropriate monetary policies, which affect house prices 
largely by controlling demand for houses through mortgage rates. The other alternative 
policy related with housing demand is down payment ratio. The gradual changes to down 
payment ratio can help to restrain long-term growth in house prices. In addition, the fixed 
effect models used indicate that different regions have different fixed characteristics. 
Hence, it is advisable to implement different structural policies in different regions, such 
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as different policies that encourage real estate enterprises to construct more housing units, 
which can substantially impact the supply side of housing market.  
On top of this, our results show that high house prices are mainly driven by real 
disposable income. In this case, when disposable income increases but house price 
increases at a greater rate, at what point are households priced out of the market? This is 
an important consideration that demands further research. 
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Chapter 3 
Problems of Affordable Housing Market: Crowding-out 
Effects 
Before analyzing the problems of affordable housing market, this chapter first illustrates 
the reasons of implementing affordable housing program. As shown in Chapter 2, to 
answer the question of at what point are households priced out of the market, the problem 
of housing affordability should be introduced. 
3.1 Housing affordability in China’s housing market  
Housing affordability is an expression of the social and material experiences of people, 
constructed as households, in relation to their individual housing situations (Stone, 2006). 
Affordability expresses the challenges that each household faces in balancing the cost of 
actual or potential housing and non-housing expenditures within the constraints of its 
income (Stone, 2006). One of the most important indicators measuring housing 
affordability is the price-to-income ratio. Chen et al. (2006) pointed out that it is widely 
believed that a price-to-income ratio with value of over 7 is intolerable. In other words, 
households cannot afford a home if the price is seven times their annual family earnings.  
As a result of the substantial increase in housing prices after the reform in 1998, 
authorities and academics began to be concerned about the buying capability of ordinary 
households. For example, Chen et al. (2006), Liu et al. (2008), Chen (2012), and Shen 
(2012) were particularly interested in the big cities (Beijing, and Shanghai). In the 
Beijing market, Liu et al. (2008) use the price-to-income ratio and the Housing 
Affordability Index (HAI) model to measure housing affordability. They find that the 
price-to-income ratio fluctuated from 6.69 to 9.12 over the period 2002 to 2006 (based on 
an average gross floor space of 60 square meters). Chen et al. (2010) examined the 
housing affordability in Shanghai, and find that the price-to-income ratio varies from 6.6 
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to 9.1 over the period from 1995 to 2008 (the ratio reached 9.1 in 2004). During the 
period 2002 to 2006, the price-to-income ratio in Shanghai varied from 7.9 to 9.1, a little 
higher than that of Beijing. In addition, Mak et al. (2007) pointed out that in Tianjin in 
2000, the price-to-income ratio of commodity housing sized 60 square meters was as high 
as 17.2. Table 2.6 compares the price-to-income ratios between Beijing and Shanghai 
over the period 2002 to 2006.  
Table 3.1 Price-to-income ratios in Beijing and Shanghai, 2002–200626 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Beijing 7.17 6.82 6.69 7.35 9.12 
Shanghai 7.9 8.1 9.1 8.6 8.1 
Source: Summaries of the studies by Chen et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2008) 
According to the measure of 7 in 2006, both urban households in Beijing and Shanghai 
faced the problem of housing affordability. Liu et al. (2008) pointed out that the rapid 
growth of housing prices is causing the gap between housing prices and income levels to 
continue widening, which indicates that a large proportion of Beijing households cannot 
afford housing. In addition, Chen and Hao (2007) argued that the increasing inequality 
between income and wealth is the essence of the housing affordability problem faced by 
Shanghai households. Based on the evidence of this increasing inequality, as well as the 
analysis in Chapter 1, it can be concluded that China’s urban households face a problem 
of housing affordability. Shen (2012) further suggested that measured in terms of the 
price-to-income ratio, housing affordability in China is very high relative to other 
developed countries, which further supports our conclusions. 
To ease the affordability problem, Liu et al. (2008) argued that the governments should 
implement new housing provision policies, especially with regard to the affordable 
housing program. In addition, owing to the affordability problem, many households have 
to remain in the rental market for many years before being able to buy a home. In the 
                                                             
26 There is little literature on the price-to-income ratios of other cities. Hence, we only summarize the two 
cities mentioned here. 
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rental market, the lowest-income households cannot even rent housing (Liu et al., 2008). 
Therefore, it is necessary for the government to implement a public housing program as a 
supplemental policy to ensure that these lowest-income households are able to rent 
housing units. From the analysis in Section 1.4, the affordable and public housing 
markets have several problems. The next two chapters analyze the main problems in these 
two markets in more detail. 
The following sections of this chapter examine the crowding-out effects of affordable 
and unaffordable housing in China from 1999 to 2010, by using panel data on housing 
construction. Applying the Dynamic Panel Model allows this chapter to examine the 
dynamic interactions between affordable and unaffordable housing construction when 
controlling for region-specific fixed and time-specific effects. This chapter analyzes 
whether affordable (unaffordable) housing construction has changed in response to the 
past and contemporaneous construction of unaffordable (affordable) housing. The 
empirical results reveal an asymmetric crowding-out pattern between affordable and 
unaffordable housing. We also observe that when urbanization rate is lower than 57.39%, 
unaffordable housing construction would crowd out affordable housing construction. 
Moreover, the crowding-out effect of unaffordable housing on affordable housing 
decreases with rising urbanization rates. 
3.2 Introduction  
China initiated reforms in 1979 and embarked upon a process of market transit ion from a 
state-oriented to a market-oriented economy. Consequently, the state aimed to establish a 
market-oriented housing system by dispersing housing responsibility among households, 
individuals and work units. China launched the housing monetization reform in 1998, 
urging urban residents to satisfy their housing needs in the open market (Mok and Forrest, 
2009). Comprehensive implementation of the housing monetization reform has led to 
rapid increase in residential housing prices. This price increase is  disproportionate to the 
annual income of households. Until 2010, the average selling price of residential housing 
was RMB 4725 per square meter, and per capita annual incomes for urban and rural 
households were RMB 21033 and RMB 5919, respectively, for the same year. The per 
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capita average income for the entire country in 2010 was calculated as RMB 13428.81, 
based on the urbanization rate of 49.68%. Similarly, per capita living space for the entire 
country was calculated as 32.86 square meters. By using these data, the house 
price-to-income ratio of residential housing for 2010 was obtained as 11.56 for the entire 
country. This massive number indicates that many households could not afford housing.  
To address the housing problem, the Chinese government implemented the affordable 
housing program, wherein commercial housing, deemed affordable to households with 
low and moderate incomes, was provided at lower prices as a kind of social security. 
Under this program, the government sponsored real estate enterprises for construction of 
affordable housing of reasonably adequate standards in some demarcated locations at 
reasonable prices. The price ratio of affordable housing to commercial residential housing 
was 0.5280 in 2010. Some other enterprises were directed to construct a certain 
proportion of affordable housing as part of their commercial residential housing 
construction projects. Under the program of affordable housing, the government urged the 
real estate enterprises to construct affordable housing units by subsidizing other taxes and 
fees and exempting land transaction costs, in addition to the regular construction of 
unaffordable housing, including ordinary commodity residential housing at market prices, 
high-end flats and villas. Supply of both affordable and unaffordable housing by the real 
estate enterprises gives rise to the problem of crowding out. Such enterprises fund both 
affordable and unaffordable housing projects from a fixed stock of gross capital, which 
necessitates them to scale back one project at the cost of the other. Hence, an increase in 
affordable (unaffordable) housing leads to a corresponding reduction in unaffordable 
(affordable) housing.  
Several researchers have focused on studying crowding-out effects in the housing 
market. Murray (1983) used time series data of subsidized and unsubsidized housing from 
1961 to 1977 for estimating crowding-out effects, and applied a standard demand-supply 
model and estimated it using the two-stage least squares method. The conclusions 
revealed that unsubsidized housing starts significantly offset the effect of the stock of 
subsidized housing starts (Murray, 1983). Later, Murray (1999) applied econometric tools 
of co-integration to analyze crowding out of the stock of subsidized and private housing 
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units and found a long-run equilibrium relationship between unsubsidized housing and 
subsidized housing in the period from 1935 to 1987. This research further estimated an 
error-correction model and testes crowding out with restrictions on the error-correction 
terms. The conclusions clearly indicated that low-income subsidized housing does not 
crowd out private housing. Increase in real income and urbanization have spurred 
increase in both public and private housing (Murray, 1999). Sinai and Waldfogel (2005) 
differed from Murray (1999) in that they consider cross-sectional data for examining 
whether the housing markets with more subsidized housing units will have more total 
stocks of housing units. Their conclusions showed that there is less crowding-out effects 
in more populous markets and more crowding-out effects in markets with an excess 
demand for subsidized housing (Sinai and Waldfogel, 2005). Eriksen and Rosenthal (2010) 
also considered cross-sectional data for studying the crowding-out effects of the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program on low-moderate income housing 
construction. Their estimations revealed that the LIHTC program does not have a 
significant impact on the number of newly developed rental housing units. Besides, 
instrumental variables’ estimates yielded substantially greater crowding out than ordinary 
least squares in their linear models (Eriksen and Rosenthal, 2010). This shows the 
importance of proper estimation methods. Additionally, Lee (2007) advanced the research 
of crowding out in housing markets by using panel data, and employed panel vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models to examine the effects of public rental housing investment 
on private housing investment, and vice versa. The findings revealed that public and 
private housing investments affect each other and the crowding-out effect rises with the 
housing availability ratio (Lee, 2007). 
Researchers have studied crowding-out effects in the context of housing starts, stock 
and investments in the housing market. However, to the best of our knowledge, limited 
research has been undertaken on the newly constructed housing units.
27
For studying 
crowding out, researchers prefer using cross-sectional data (e.g., Sinai and Waldgogel, 
2005; Eriksen and Rosenthal, 2010) and time-series data (Murray, 1983; Murray, 1999). 
                                                             
27For example, newly constructed housing units in 2010 refer to the floor spaces of 
housing units completed by the real estate enterprises in that particular year for the entire 
country. 
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Only Lee (2007) applied panel data for undertaking such a study. The panel data have 
several advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data in that they contain more 
accurate inference of model parameters and greater capacity for capturing complexity in 
behavior and simplifying computation and statistical inference (Cheng, 2007). Besides, 
panel data provides the strongest test for the “crowding-out” hypothesis (Van and Arts, 
2005). Chinese researchers have paid limited attention to the study of crowding-out 
effects in the housing market. Although the affordable housing program was implemented 
in 1995, to the best of our knowledge, until now only two studies have mentioned the 
crowding-out effect. Zhao et al. (2013) pointed out that by crowding out business 
investment, affordable housing investments do not promote GDP growth. Chen and Wang 
(2011) indicated that the affordable housing supply does not crowd out commercial 
housing (Chen and Wang, 2011). However, both these studies did not clarify the reason 
and process of crowding out. China’s experience in the past decade provides a good case 
study for examining crowding-out effects in housing markets. This chapter applies the 
panel data to analyze crowding-out effects of newly constructed housing units in China 
from 1999 to 2010. Specifically, crowding-out effects between affordable and 
unaffordable housing is studied. Our analysis contributes to existing literature and 
advances the context examined by previous studies in this area in three main ways. First, 
we provide a case study on crowding out in the Chinese housing market. China’s 
affordable housing program began a little later than that of the other developed countries, 
and there are few studies in this area. Second, this chapter applies Dynamic Panel Model, 
including both region-specific and time-specific effects, for affordable and unaffordable 
housing construction.
28
 To the best of our knowledge, little previous study in this area 
uses the Dynamic Panel Model to estimate crowding-out effects in the housing market. 
This model helps in focusing on dynamic interactions between affordable and 
unaffordable housing. Third, before we start our analysis, we provide a brief account of 
the history of Chinese housing policy development since the establishment of the People's 
Republic of China in 1949. Although the pace of development of the housing market was 
                                                             
28
Affordable and unaffordable housing are hereafter referred to as affordable and unaffordable newly 
completed housing units.  
48 
 
slow before 1998, some housing policies were adopted even then. Few researchers have 
outlined such a detailed summarization to the best of our knowledge. 
Using Dynamic Panel Model, we first explore whether affordable housing construction 
would change in response to unaffordable housing construction, and vice versa. We 
mainly focus on the crowding-out effects between affordable and unaffordable housing in 
China. Our results reveal that (i) affordable housing and unaffordable housing 
constructions crowd out each other with an asymmetric pattern; (ii) the crowding-out 
effect of unaffordable housing on affordable housing decreases with increase in 
urbanization rate: if the urbanization rate is lower than 57.39%, crowding out occurs; 
otherwise, filling-in effect is detected; and (iii) unaffordable housing construction 
responds to affordable housing during the same period. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient shows that a unit increase in affordable housing leads to a decrease by 1.460 
units in unaffordable housing. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes the 
history of China’s housing policy development since 1949 and housing market 
development since 1995. Section 3.3 describes the Dynamic Panel Model and data used 
for analysis. Section 3.4 presents the empirical results and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.3 Problems of affordable housing market 
In Section 1.4, we illustrate that the current problem of affordable housing market is the 
decreasing construction of affordable housing. Besides, there was significant variation in 
implementation of the affordable housing program across different provinces and regions. 
Shanghai implemented this program only in the years 1999 and 2009, and Tibet did not 
take up this program in 2004, 2005 and 2010. Because of these inconsistencies in 
implementation timeframes, we do not include Shanghai and Tibet in our analysis, and 
select the other 29 provinces and regions as our sample
29
. Moreover, although these 
provinces and regions implemented the affordable housing program, they present 
different trends and results because of difference in population,  urbanization rate and 
                                                             
29 Although Table 3.2 shows that Hainan province did not complete any floor  spaces of affordable housing 
in 2010, during the other periods over 1999 to 2009, it completed affordable housing floor spaces as well. 
Therefore, we include Hainan province in our sample.  
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regional GDP. Basic information about these 29 provinces and regions for the year 2010 
is provided in Table 3.2. As shown in the table, the proportion of completed floor spaces 
in affordable housing of Tianjin is the highest of all samples. However, the regional GDP 
of Tianjin is the second lowest. The urbanization rate of Tianjin is 61.11%, the second 
highest value after Beijing. The population proportion is only 0.99%. Hainan province 
does not construct affordable housing units. Beijing has the highest urbanization rate and 
its floor spaces in completed affordable housing constitute of 4.54% of all the samples. 
Although Jiangsu province has the highest regional GDP, the floor spaces of completed 
affordable housing are 3019.40 thousand square meters. Therefore, we can say that 
regional variations exist in implementation of the affordable housing program.  
Table 3.2 Basic Information about the 29 provinces and regions in 2010 
 
Source: China Premium Database in CEIC Database; China 
Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook (2000-2011). 
Note: The ratio equals the proportion of each region in the 
national total.  
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3.4 The dynamic panel model and data specification 
We use provincial panel data to address the crowding-out effects in housing construction 
in China. Panel VAR models, such as those employed by Lee (2007), are used to explain 
evolution of variables based on their own lags and the lags of other model variables. 
Hence, they cannot reflect contemporaneous effects among the variables. We primarily 
focus on the interaction between affordable and unaffordable housing. Not only past 
values, but also contemporaneous values of unaffordable housing construction may 
influence affordable housing. Additionally, affordable housing construction  could be 
affected by other variables such as urbanization rate, total construction and GDP. Thus, 
we apply the Dynamic Panel Model for avoiding the problems of panel VAR model and to 
properly reflect our emphasis.  
3.4.1 Theoretical framework 
This section offers several theoretical explanations in support of the following two points. 
First, why does urbanization play an important role in housing construction? We assume 
that the housing market in China can be divided into urban housing market and rural 
housing market. Population flow, business flows and housing consumption are 
unrestricted between the two partial markets. The overall housing market would reach 
equilibrium only if housing prices are equal in these two markets. If there is more 
migration from rural to urban areas, the demand for housing decreases in the rural area 
and increases in the urban area, increasing housing prices in the latter and bringing down 
prices in the former. In this situation, to earn more profits, the real estate enterprises 
would transfer to the urban housing market. Hence, urban housing construction increases 
and rural housing construction decreases. We can conclude that if this trend of 
urbanization persists, the housing demand in the urban area will be greater than rural ar ea, 
making it difficult to achieve market equilibrium. Even if the urban and rural housing 
markets are in equilibrium, the high house price-to-income ratio prevents poorer families 
from affording houses. In this situation, the government has to interfere in the housing 
market to help the poor families solve their housing problems. Thus, urbanization trends 
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play an important role in housing construction and government interference in housing 
markets.  
Second, what causes crowding out to occur between affordable and unaffordable 
housing construction? In our case, the government exempts land transaction costs and 
subsidizes other taxes and fees to encourage real estate enterprises to construct affordable 
housing. The government extends several project-based subsidies to real estate 
enterprises for facilitating reduced housing costs. Suppose the costs are fixed, the 
subsidies could be considered as raising the selling price indirectly
30
. When the indirect 
price of affordable housing is higher than the price of unaffordable housing, it is in the 
interest of real estate enterprises to supply more affordable housing for substituting 
unaffordable housing. On the contrary, when the price of unaffordable housing is higher, 
the estate enterprises supply more unaffordable housing. The substitution effect ceases to 
occur only if the indirect price of affordable housing equals the price of unaffordable 
housing.  
We now consider Figure 3.1, which portrays the crowding-out effects between 
affordable and unaffordable housing construction. When more affordable housing units 
are built, they would crowd out the amount of unaffordable housing units built. 
Conversely, unaffordable housing units are constructed more, and then amount of 
affordable housing constructed will be crowded out. From Figure 3.1, the magnitudes of 
crowding out effects between their construction change depending on different situations. 
Actually, the crowding out effect of unaffordable on affordable housing construction is 
higher than that of affordable housing construction.  
                                                             
30 If a household buys a house with subsidies, real selling price should equal to the money paid to real 
estate enterprises plus the subsidies, which raise selling price indirectly.  
52 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Crowding-out effects of affordable housing construction 
3.4.2 Dynamic panel model 
Explanatory variables in the dynamic panel model we have used include not only the lags 
of dependent variables, but also the lags of some explanatory variables. A simple form of 
Dynamic Panel Model with first order lagged term and exogenous variables are shown as 
follows: 
11 1 20 21 1 03
l
it it it it l lit i t itl
y y x x z                        (3.1) 
where ity  refers to the dependent variable for region i  in year t , and if 11 1  , it is 
stationary;  itx  is the explanatory variable whose first order lag is a regressor;  itz  
represents the other exogenous variables; i  is region-specific fixed effect and t  is 
time-specific effect; and it  is idiosyncratic error. Furthermore, we assume that all 
explanatory variables are independent of it .  
We intend to explain the crowding-out effects between affordable and unaffordable 
housing construction. However, housing construction could also be affected by regional 
urbanization levels, income and the overall housing market situation. This chapter 
reflects these influence factors by using the variables of urbanization rate, GDP, total 
construction and price ratios of affordable housing to residential housing. First, 
urbanization rate is an important factor affecting both demand- and supply-side of 
housing construction. Regions with high levels of urbanization may cause an increase in 
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demand of affordable housing, thus, driving up housing prices. Moreover, high prices of 
commercial residential housing prevent migrants from affording houses by themselves. In 
this situation, the government would encourage real estate enterprises to build more 
affordable housing units. However, to pursue higher profits, real estate enterprises prefer 
constructing more unaffordable housing. The amount of subsidies given to real estate 
enterprises determines the outcome of this “game.” Second, regional GDP reflects the 
level of household income to some extent. This is the expression of household purchasing 
capacity and effective demand of houses. Third, the level of total construction, referring 
to floor spaces of houses constructed by real estate enterprises and individuals, could 
report the overall housing market situation. A high value of total construction illustrates 
that the housing market supplies more houses, including affordable houses. Fourth, price 
ratios of affordable housing to residential housing would influence the housing market 
situation. A high value of this ratio indicates a relatively higher price of affordable 
housing for a region, implying that real estate enterprises would be willing to construct 
more affordable housing units. Additionally, we control for the region-specific fixed and 
time-specific effects. The variable specifications are shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3 Explanations and data source of the variables  
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We intend to apply Dynamic Panel Model to analyze the interaction between affordable 
and unaffordable housing construction. Accordingly, we consider the explained variables 
of affordable housing and unaffordable housing construction as itaf  and ituaf , 
respectively. Our Dynamic Panel Model contains the lags of explained and explanatory 
variables, as well as the current values of explanatory variables. Additionally, since 
urbanization rate plays an important role in determining housing construction, we control 
for the interaction terms between urbanization rate and affordable/unaffordable housing 
construction. Before modelling the models, we have to ascertain the lag lengths for the 
variables of affordable housing construction, unaffordable housing construction and the 
interactions of urbanization rate and affordable/unaffordable housing construction. By the 
Akaike and Schwarz information criteria (Akaike, 1974; Schwarz, 1978), we conclude 
that the best lag length for all the three variables is one. Thus, the affordable housing 
construction equation takes the following empirical form:  
11 1 20 21 1 31 1 1 40
41 1 1 50 60 70 80
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it i t
it
it
af uaf uaf ru af ru uaf
ru uaf ru total lgdp pr
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       
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       
     (3.2) 
where the variables itaf , ituaf , it itru uaf , itru , ittotal , itlgdp , itpr , have the same 
specification as that in Table 3.3; the variables 1ituaf  , 1 1it itru uaf  , and 1 1it itru af    
refer to the first order lagged terms of corresponding variable; i  is the region specific 
intercept, which represents the unobserved region-specific fixed effects and i =Beijing 
(BJ), Tianji (TJ), Hebei (HEB), Shanxi (SX), Inner Mongolia (IM), Liaoning (LN) , Jilin 
(JL), Heilongjiang (HLJ), Jiangsu (JS), Anhui (AH), Fujian (FJ), Jiangxi (JX), Shandong 
(SD), Henan (HEN), Hubei (HB), Hunan (HUN), Guangdong (GD), Guangxi (GX), 
Hainan (HN), Chongqing (CQ), Sichuan (SC), Yunnan (YN), Shaanxi (SAX), Qinghai 
(QH), Ningxia (NX) and Xinjiang (XJ); t  is the year specific intercept; 
1999, ,2010t  ; and it  is the idiosyncratic error term.  
We use the following controlled Equation (3.3) for Equation (3.2) to compare the 
effects of urbanization on affordable housing construction. Urbanization levels represent 
both demand- and supply-side of affordable housing. Equation (3.3) is expressed as 
follows: 
11 20 21 30 40 50 61 1 0it it it it i t iit it it it tru total lgdpaf af uaf u raf p                                                                    
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(3.3) 
In Equation (3.3), we do not consider the variables that reflect the interaction between 
urbanization rate and affordable/unaffordable housing construction as our explanatory 
variables. The other variables in this equation have the same specification as in Equation 
(3.2).  
Similarly, for unaffordable housing construction, we can obtain a function of the 
lagged values as follows: 
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    (3.4) 
The controlled equation for Equation (3.4) is the following, 
11 1 20 21 1 30 40 50 60
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
it it it it it it it it i t ituaf uaf af af ru total lgdp pr                             
(3.5) 
Using Equations (3.2) and (3.3), we can calculate the effects of unaffordable housing 
on affordable housing construction. We know that construction of the former at time t  
and 1t   could affect the latter at time t.  
From Equation (3.2), the effects could be calculated as follows:  
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            (3.6) 
If the values of partial derivatives are negative, we consider that unaffordable housing 
construction would crowd out affordable housing construction. On the contrary, if these 
values are positive, we infer that unaffordable housing construction would induce 
affordable housing construction. Similarly, if the estimated coefficients, 40  and 41 , 
are negative, we conclude that there would be serious crowding-out effects in regions 
with low levels of urbanization. 
From Equation (3.3), crowding-out effects are expressed as follows:  
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                  (3.7) 
The explanations of the values of partial derivatives in Equation (3.7) are the same as 
those in Equation (3.6). 
Similarly, for Equation (3.4) and (3.5), the effects of affordable housing on 
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unaffordable housing construction could be calculated as follows:  
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If the values of partial derivatives shown in Equations (3.8) and (3.9) are negative, we 
can infer that affordable housing construction would crowd out unaffordable housing 
construction. However, if these values are positive, we consider that affordable housing 
construction would induce unaffordable housing construction, which is referred to as the 
“filling-in” effect. If the estimated coefficients of 40ˆ  and 41ˆ  shown in Equation (3.8) 
are negative, we infer that crowding-out effects would be serious in regions with high 
levels of urbanization. 
3.4.3 The estimation method 
Choosing an appropriate estimation method is essential for proper estimation of our 
Dynamic Panel Model. We choose the 29 provinces and regions of China as our sample 
and 1999 to 2010 as our study period. Since the different regions vary substantially, as 
seen from Table 3.2, our Dynamic Panel Model includes region-specific effects. Besides, 
the length of time period is 12. On presenting the affordable housing construction for this 
period, we find that this variation includes the time trend as well. Therefore, our models 
include time-specific effects. When estimating coefficients, we first eliminate the 
region-specific effects by using differencing method. For time-specific effects, we use 
time dummy variables. Moreover, in the case of “large N and small T,” the common 
estimators ignore the presence of time-specific effects and are inconsistent. Nevertheless, 
the panel dynamic generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator, proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed,  whether 
region-specific effects are treated as fixed or random, since it eliminates the effects from 
the specification (Cheng, 2007; Cheng and Tahmiscioglu, 2008). This method is as 
follows: take the first differences of each model to eliminate fixed effects and then apply 
GMM to the first difference models using valid instruments. The GMM estimator 
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optimally exploit all the linear moment restrictions that follow from the assumption of no 
serial correlation in the error, and uses the level of lagged variables as the instruments for 
first difference explanatory variables
31
 (Arellano and Bond, 1991). We can deal with the 
endogeneity problem by using GMM estimator. Besides, since substantial variation 
among the sampled regions causes the problem of heteroskedasticity, robust standard 
errors are estimated. The estimation results show that the estimated coefficients of the 
lagged independent variable are in the expected range, so we use the one -step difference 
GMM estimators (Roodman, 2009). 
3.4.4 Data specifications 
As mentioned earlier, this chapter uses panel data including 29 provinces and regions, and 
a 12-year period. Data has been collected from various databases related to housing 
construction. We collected data relating to floor spaces in completed affordable housing 
and residential housing constructed by real estate enterprises from the China Premium 
Data in the CEIC database. We then calculated the floor spaces of completed unaffordable 
housing by subtracting floor spaces of completed affordable housing from completed 
residential housing. The urbanization rates for all regions from 1999 to 2010 are collected 
from the China Population and Employment Statistics Yearbook. The floor spaces of total 
construction refer to houses constructed by both real estate enterprises and indi viduals. 
These values, regional GDP and prices of affordable and residential housing, were 
collected from the China Premium Data in the CEIC database. Price ratio was obtained by 
dividing affordable housing by the price of residential housing. The total sample size, 
including all collected data, is 348. Table 3.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables considered for this study. Hainan province did not construct affordable housing 
in 2010 (see Table 3.2). Hence, the minimum value of itaf  and it itru af  is zero. 
 
                                                             
31
 For instance, the instruments for 
, 1 , 1 , 2i t i t i taf af af      are , 2 , 3, ,i t i taf af  , because these level 
variables will remain orthogonal to the first-differenced error term 
, 1it it i t       as long as it  is 
serially uncorrelated. 
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics 
 
Notes: Detailed variable descriptions are given in Table 3.3.  
3.5 Empirical results 
Before we get to empirical results, we present the various relationships between 
affordable and unaffordable housing construction. Figure 3.2 displays the floor spaces of 
affordable and unaffordable housing completed since 1996. The floor spaces completed 
of affordable housing are always at lower levels compared with unaffordable housing. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the affordable housing program, the ratio of affordable 
housing construction to unaffordable housing construction was at slightly higher values. 
This value kept on rising until 2000, when it reached its highest value at  35.27%.
32
 From 
2001 to 2010, this ratio decreased year over year; in 2010, it stood at only 5.32%. 
Although it is not an obvious inference, it can be observed that affordable housing 
construction decreased with rapid growth in unaffordable housing construction since 
2001. This implies that they demonstrate an opposite moving tendency, thus, indicating 
the existence of crowding-out effects. This inference has been proved by the following 
econometric analysis.  
                                                             
32
 Refer to subsection 2.2 on housing market development in China since 1995 for reasons that caused 
affordable housing construction to decrease in 2002. 
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Figure 3.2 Floor spaces of affordable and unaffordable housing completed in 
China since 1996 
Source: China Premium Database in CEIC Database. 
We estimated Dynamic Panel Model for affordable and unaffordable housing 
construction. The use of the GMM method to estimate Equations (3.2) to (3.5) would 
eliminate the region-specific effects. For incorporating the time-specific effects, we use 
“ yeart ” as time dummy variables. For the first-difference estimation, we need to drop an 
additional year dummy variable (Lee, 2007). As a result, we have 290 estimation samples. 
Table 3.4 reports the estimation results. All specifications that control for the 
year-specific dummy variables are supported by the Wald test at 0.1% significance level. 
This is evidence in support of our Dynamic Panel Model.  In addition, the GMM approach 
is based on the assumption of no residual autocorrelation, and at least no second-order 
correlation based on residual (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Dang, Kim, and Shin, 2014). In 
theory, the conditions can be evaluated by using AR(1) and AR(2) tests (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991). AR(1) and AR(2) denote Arellano–Bond tests for the first- and second-order 
autocorrelation in first-differenced error terms, respectively. The null hypothesis of AR(2) 
test is there are no second order autocorrelations of error term in the first order difference 
equations. Since the p -value of AR(2) in each equation is greater than 5%, it denotes no 
second order autocorrelation in first order difference equation. This is another supportive 
evidence of our models. 
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First, we examine crowding-out effects of unaffordable housing construction on 
affordable housing construction. The Case 1 in Table 3.5 shows the estimated results of 
Equation (3.3), which does not control for the interaction terms of urbanization rate with 
affordable/unaffordable housing construction. The results show that the current and 
lagged values of unaffordable housing construction do not appear to be the causes of 
affordable housing construction, since their coefficients are small and weak in statistical 
significance. The estimated coefficient of the lagged value of affordable housing 
construction is 0.636 at the 0.1% significance level, which implies that if affordable 
housing construction in the previous period increases by 1 square meter, current 
affordable housing construction would increase 0.636 square meters. When unaffordable 
housing construction is the dependent variable, Case 3 does not control for the interaction 
of affordable housing and unaffordable housing construction. The results indicate that 
affordable housing construction affects unaffordable housing construction during the 
same period. The coefficient of affordable housing construction at time t is -0.624 at 
0.1% significance level. If the current affordable housing construction increases 1 square 
meter, current unaffordable housing construction would decrease 0.624 square meters. 
This indicates that affordable housing construction would crowd out unaffordable 
housing construction. This can be easily understood by the following explanation. Since 
the gross capital of real estate enterprises is fixed, they construct more affordable housing 
units at the cost of unaffordable housing units. Furthermore, unaffordable housing 
construction is positively related to total construction. This shows that residential houses 
are mainly constructed by the real estate enterprises.  
When controlling for the interaction terms of urbanization rate with affordable and 
unaffordable housing construction, we obtain different results. From the estimated 
coefficients shown in Cases 2 and 4 in Table 3.5, we find that the interaction terms
33
 are 
highly statistically significant. In Case 2, the estimated coefficients for interaction terms 
1 1it itru af   and it itru uaf  are at the 5% and 0.1% significance levels, respectively. The 
coefficients of ituaf  are also significant at 0.1% level. From the coefficients of 
                                                             
33 The reason why we use the interaction terms is that we want to examine the  relationship between the 
crowding-out effect changes and the urbanization rates.  
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it itru uaf  and ituaf , we can infer that the crowding-out effect of unaffordable housing 
on affordable housing, for the same period, would decrease with rise in urbanization rates. 
When urbanization rate is below 57.39%
34
, unaffordable housing construction would 
crowd out affordable housing construction. On the contrary, if this value is over 57.39%, 
unaffordable housing construction induces affordable housing construction, resulting in a 
“filling-in” effect. Similarly, Case 4 shows the results when controlling for the interaction 
terms and dependent variable is 
ituaf . From the coefficients of itaf , we find that the 
effects of affordable housing construction on unaffordable housing construction during 
the same period is -1.460, indicating that affordable housing construction crowd out 
unaffordable housing construction. The estimated coefficients represent that the lagged 
value of interaction term 1 1it itru uaf   is -0.861 at 0.1% significance level. Besides, the 
coefficients of 1ituaf   become significant at 0.1% significance level compared with the 
results without controlling for interaction terms.  
Results from the above analysis indicate that interaction between affordab le and 
unaffordable housing construction during the same period exists when controlling for the 
interaction terms of urbanization rate with affordable and unaffordable housing 
construction. This reflects the asymmetric crowding-out pattern between affordable and 
unaffordable housing construction, which implies that construction of one particular type 
responds to the current value of the other type. However, the crowding-out effect from 
affordable housing to unaffordable housing is greater than the opposite effect from 
unaffordable to affordable housing. Besides, the interaction term of unaffordable housing 
with urbanization rate has a negative effect on affordable housing construction. However, 
the interaction term of affordable housing with urbanization rate would not affect 
unaffordable housing construction. These results indicate the existence of a competitive 
relationship between affordable and unaffordable housing construction. This is easily 
                                                             
34 Actually, this result is robust in both short run and long run.  Here, we considered the effects in the short 
run. Substituting the estimated coefficients into 20 40
af
it
ruituaf
it
 

 

, we obtained the critical value of 
urbanization rate as 57.39%.When considering the long-run crowding-out effects, affordable and 
unaffordable housing construction are assumed to be constant. Then, we know the long-run effects would be 
( ) ( )20 21 40 41
1 11 31
ruaf itit
uaf ruit it
   
 
  

  
. Using the estimated coefficient, we then compute the critical value of 
urbanization rate, which is also 57.39%. 
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understood given the reasoning presented before. Both types of housing are constructed 
by real estate enterprises and the prices of affordable housing are lower than unaffordable 
housing. The mean value of price ratio between affordable and residential housing is only 
0.6947. Hence, real estate enterprises would obtain less benefit from investing in 
affordable housing. They are less likely to construct affordable housing units. This might 
be the reason for year over year decrease in floor spaces of completed affordable housing.  
Overall, our empirical evidence indicates crowding-out effects between affordable and 
unaffordable housing. Crowding-out effects would be serious when the urbanization rate 
is lower than 57.39%. This occurs because high affordable housing demand in regions 
with high level of urbanization prompts local governments to implement policies 
encouraging affordable housing construction to solve the housing problem, which, in turn 
reduces crowding-out effects. Among the provinces and regions studied, the urbanization 
rate of only Beijing and Tianjin are higher than this critical value. Therefore, crowding 
out is the primary problem when implementing the affordable housing program in China. 
One could be concerned about possible problems of nonstationary in estimated results for 
the level data. The first-difference regressions are an option to get around the 
nonstationary problem. We have applied this method to examine whether the level data 
analysis is robust enough. Table 3.6 shows the first difference regression results for 
checking robustness. The p -value of AR(2) test in Table 6 shows no second order 
autocorrelation in first order difference equation, which supports our models.  Case 6 in 
Table 3.6 shows that the difference of affordable housing construction responds to that of 
unaffordable housing construction and the interactive term _ it itd ru uaf . The estimated 
coefficients of _ itd uaf  and _ it itd ru uaf  show that the crowding-out effect of the 
difference of unaffordable on affordable housing construction would decrease with 
increase in the urbanization rate. Case 8 in Table 3.6 shows that difference of affordable 
housing construction would crowd out that of unaffordable housing construction, 
although the estimated results in Case 8 are a little different from that in Case 4. We 
conclude that the results shown in Table 3.6 support the results obtained from Table 3.5. 
In the two tables, “ yeart ” is the year t -specific effect, where 2001, ,2010t  ; for 
example, time dummy variable “year2001” refers to the dummy of year of 2001. If a 
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province has a number in one year, the time dummy variable for the year is equal to 1, or 
else 0. For each equation, instrumental variables include two parts: the vector of 
 1 , 2, ,i i ty y   are GMM instruments, and itX  are the other standard instruments for 
the first-differenced equations. For example, in Case 1, the following instrumental 
variables for GMM are used: dynamic panel instruments are 
2
af
it
 and 
3
af
it
; other 
instruments are uafit , 1uafit 
, ruit , totalit , gl dpit , prit , 2001year , 
2002year , 2003year , 2004year , 2005year , 2006year , 2007year ,  2008year , 
2009year , and 2010year . AR(1) and AR(2) denote Arellano–Bond tests for the first- 
and second-order autocorrelation in first-differenced error terms, respectively. The results 
of AR(2) denote no second-order autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.  
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Table 3.5 Interactions between affordable and unaffordable housing construction by 
specification: level regression 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% respectively.  
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Table 3.6 Interactions between affordable and unaffordable housing construction by 
specification: first difference regression results 
 
Notes: The prefix “d” denotes the first-difference value of the 
variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*
, 
**
, 
*** 
denotes significance at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% respectively.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter analyzed crowding-out effects between affordable and unaffordable housing 
construction in China by using province-level panel data. We chose 29 provinces and 
regions in China as our sample. The data include floor spaces of completed affordable 
and unaffordable housing construction, urbanization rate, total floor spaces of completed 
residential housing, regional GDP and prices of affordable and residential housing. We 
applied Dynamic Panel Model, including region-specific and time-specific effects, to 
examine the interaction between affordable and unaffordable housing. The GMM 
estimator is a useful and valid estimator of dynamic panel data (Ahn and Schmidt, 1997; 
Cheng and Tahmiscioglu, 2008). Our results reveal an asymmetric crowding-out pattern 
between affordable and unaffordable housing construction. This implies that each is 
offset by the current value of the other and there are no lagged values. Our find ings also 
indicate that affordable housing construction, besides being related with unaffordable 
housing construction, is also related with urbanization rate. When urbanization rate is 
lower than 57.39%, unaffordable housing construction would crowd out affordable 
housing construction. Moreover, crowding out effect of unaffordable housing on 
affordable housing decreases with a rise in urbanization rate. Additionally, unaffordable 
housing construction only responds to affordable housing construction during the same 
period, as revealed by the estimated coefficient of current value of affordable housing 
construction. This indicates that affordable housing construction crowds out unaffordable 
housing construction. 
Overall, crowding out renders the affordable housing program less efficient. To address 
this, the government should take measures to encourage real estate enterprises to 
construct more affordable housing by supplying more subsidies and further reducing 
transaction taxes for selling affordable housing. Besides, the government could also 
explore other sources for expanding the supply base of affordable housing through 
methods such as selling second-hand housing units for addressing the housing problem. A 
combination of such methods would prove to be more efficient for successful 
implementation of the affordable housing program aimed at solving housing problems in 
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China.  
One limitation of this study is that it considers data pertaining to only 12 years of 
housing construction. The lack of data reporting about the subsidies provided to real 
estate enterprises is another limitation. Provision of subsidies would affect the preference 
of enterprises for construction of affordable housing. This chapter could be used as a 
foundation for further research to investigate how affordable housing programs in China 
should be developed to respond effectively to the requirements of households with low 
and moderate incomes.  
Future research could also explore the possibility of combining affordable housing 
provision with voucher programs
35
, which would be more efficient for households with 
low and moderate incomes when housing markets realize a long-run equilibrium (see Lee, 
2007). In addition, Eriksen and Rosenthal (2010) pointed out that LIHTC development 
may help low and moderate income families gain access to higher quality local schools 
and other local public services. In our case, many households are not satisfied with the 
provision of infrastructure around affordable housing. Hence, how to raise the quality of 
services offered in the vicinity of affordable housing for the convenience of residents 
could be an area of future research. Hence, how to raise the convenience of affordable 
housing is an area of future research. 
                                                             
35  Voucher program refers to the government’s program for providing housing assistance to help 
lowest-income households, the disabled people, and elderly to afford housing units in the open market.  
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Chapter 4 
Problems of Public Housing Market: Sell-Oriented Policy 
This chapter conducts a comparative analysis on the main public housing policies 
implemented in the city of Baoji, China. In addition to supplying rental public housing, 
the local government of Baoji sells public housing to lowest-income households. To 
understand the effects of the public housing program, it is necessary to measure the 
feasibility of the sell-oriented policy (SOP) and to compare the effects of the SOP and 
rent-oriented policy (ROP). The data in this chapter come from a survey conducted in 
2010 in Baoji. This chapter applies a Cobb-Douglas utility function to measure the extra 
benefits for households that fall under the SOP and households that fall under the ROP. 
The results indicate that while both policies offer benefits to households, ROP households 
benefit more than SOP households do. In contrast, the lowest-income SOP households 
have a stronger taste in terms of housing consumption, and so after buying public housing, 
they acquire more satisfaction. However, both groups of households are dissatisfied with 
the public facilities supplied to the public housing units. The main policy conclusions are 
that although the SOP could improve household utilities, the ROP is the more efficient of 
the two policies. In addition, public facilities to public housing units should be 
considered when undertaking new public housing projects.  
4.1 Introduction 
The Chinese Ministry has acknowledged that the main housing problem in China is 
unaffordability of urban poverty (Deng et al. 2009). Given increasing concerns about 
urban poverty and how it might threaten social stability and economic prosperity, the 
Chinese government has developed the public housing
36
 program, which had its official 
                                                             
36 Public housing is usually called “cheap rent housing” in China, but is similar to public housing in other 
countries. In the whole country, public housing is managed by Ministry of Housing and Urban -Rural 
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origin in Ways to Provide Public Housings for the Poorest Urban Residents in 2004 with 
the goal of strengthening the social rental housing system and renaming it the public 
housing program (Deng et al. 2009). Via the public housing program, the government 
provides housing or housing subsidies to lowest-income households to help them improve 
their housing conditions or to obtain houses in which to live (Xie , 2011). Until 2006, few 
local governments had officially used the program, but by 2010, almost all local 
governments in China had constructed public housing units.  
When a public housing program is implemented, the subsidy method is one of the most 
important aspects (Gilbert, 2012). According to the public housing program laws, there 
are two main public housing subsidy policies: a rent-oriented policy (ROP) and a rent 
subsidy policy
37
. Housing subsidies have been able to solve the housing problem 
effectively in Chile, Colombia, and South Africa, but only by having adequate funding 
(Gilbert 2004). Besides, when central government urged local governments to establish 
the public housing program, it did not dedicate funding for this purpose (Deng et al. 
2009). Although the central government might provide some support from its annual 
budget, such funding was not guaranteed and often very limited (Deng et al. 2009). Hence , 
local governments were responsible for carrying out the construction programs
38
. 
Therefore, to obtain the funding they needed, some local governments began selling 
public houses, which they had constructed, to lowest-income households at a very low 
price. In this way, local governments were able to ensure there were sufficient funds for 
the construction assignments being implemented in the next period. In this study, we refer 
to this method of subsidizing lowest-income housing as a “sell-oriented policy (SOP).” 
Thus, public housing constructed by local governments is subject to two main subsidy 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Development of the People’s Republic of China (MOHURD). In local, it is managed by local governments’ 
Housing Security Centers. In this chapter, we use the term “public housing”  for the purpose of comparison 
and understandability. 
37  When implementing the ROP, lowest-income households rent public housing constructed by the 
governments. The rent subsidy policy enables a government to give rent subsidies to lowest-income 
households to help them to rent housing in the normal rental market.  
38 Funding for these housing units came from various sources. The central government provided about 
33.33%of the funds, and the provincial government provided about 16.67%of the funds. The remaining 50% 
came from the local government itself.  In China, governments can be classified into five main 
administrative levels: the first level is the central government, which sits above the other four; secon d is the 
provincial government; third is the city government; fourth is the county government; and the fifth level is 
the township government. A higher level of government can overrule lower ones, to a certain extent. Public 
housing projects are typically constructed by a city government. Therefore, in this chapter, ‘local 
government’ refers to a city government.  
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policies: the SOP and ROP. However, there are no rules or laws governing the SOP public 
housing programs. Several officials from local governments, such as those in Baoji city, 
believe that the SOP helps governments to recycle construction funds rapidly, and so are 
in favor of it. On the other hand, some officials at the central government level insist that, 
in the case of a public housing shortage, the policy is counter to the goal of helping as 
many lowest-income households to obtain housing. Their reasoning is that, if public 
housing is sold to lowest-income households, those houses exit the market immediately, 
and can no longer be used for renting, so should take the ROP. The debates between SOP 
and ROP make it crucial to discuss their wealth effects on lowest-income households. 
This is the main objective of this chapter. 
4.2 Literature review39 
When it comes to public housing programs, rent subsidies are widely adopted around the 
world. Rent subsidies and public housing programs have a social benefit, but also contain 
both economic effects and welfare effects for the society (Tiwari and Hasegawa 2001; 
Koning and Ridder 1997). In particular, lowest-income households receive more benefits. 
However, one difficulty with these subsidies is how to calculate the benefits distribution 
between different kinds of lowest-income households. Kraft and Olsen (1973) measured 
the distribution of direct benefits to different households by using a general equilibrium 
model. They found that the mean benefits first rise and then fall, depending on the 
household income; for households with the lowest income levels, there are almost no 
benefits. Another study by Murray (1975) indicated that  the distribution of consumers’ 
surplus depends mainly on individuals’ characteristics, such as level of income, the age of 
the head of the household, race, and family composition. This study used a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function and a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function to analyze 
the effects on different households. Even though there was not much difference in 
average benefits, the results showed that, in the Cobb-Douglas case, the coefficients of 
non-housing goods and the age of the head of the household are positive and significant, 
                                                             
39 In fact, much of the references are very dated in this chapter. Because many countries have been 
implementing the public housing program for many years, e.g., US begun it in 1930s, Hong Kong is 1953, 
British is 1920s, the researchers study the related problems are dated (China begun it in 2006).  
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while the coefficient of income is positive, but not significant. Wong and Liu (1988), 
using a Cobb-Douglas utility function, found that the public housing program is 
inefficient in Hong Kong, because poor public housing tenants obtain more benefits than 
the rich, and because many of the poor are not covered by the public housing program.  
In our case, the sell-oriented policy is similar with the privatization of public housing, 
which is a flat-for-sale scheme mainly for public rental housing tenants as well as those 
eligible private rental tenants. This policy was launched in 1978 in Hong Kong – Home 
Ownership Scheme (Ho, 2004); and in US the launch of the privatization of public 
housing
40
 was in 1988 (Schill, 1990). Some studies suggested that privatization of public 
housing would be an alternative policy for public housing program. Ho (1995) pointed 
out that in Hong Kong, privatization of public housing is economic efficiency, “policy 
efficiency,” and equity. In further, Ho (2004) discussed methods of privatizing public 
housing, and used the sequential model to examine every stage of the privatization 
process. The results indicated that the government should not ignore numerous mistakes 
in the privatization process, and do something to replace market interventions with 
market mechanisms. According to Kirwan (1984), whatever the motives of individual 
tenants and whether through choice or constraint, privatization “must be seen as one 
component of a more general trend towards the reconstitution of public housing as market 
or economic rent housing.” However, there are major problems with this strategy that the 
selective effect of the policy filters out relatively advantaged households and properties, 
leaving behind the least advantaged household in the worst accommodation, incapable 
and unwilling to pay increased rents (Flynn, 1988). Hence, Schill (1990) pointed out that 
the privatization of public housing units remains at the forefront of the housing policy 
debates.  
Research on the public housing program in China is still characterized by controversy 
on which kind of subsidy policy should be adopted. Several researchers point out that, 
when there is a shortage of housing stock, the ROP should be chosen (J iang, 2007; Liu, 
2004). Zhang (2009) suggested that, in the short term, the ROP is more efficient. Then, in 
                                                             
40 The Commission on Privatization recommended that Congress direct the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (‘HUD’) to sell public housing units to tenants at discounted prices  (Schill 
1990).  
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the long term, this policy should transition to a rent subsidy policy. The effects of the 
public housing subsidy policy were analyzed by Zhou (2008, 2010). Zhou (2008) 
compared households receiving rent subsidies to those who are not subsidized, and found 
that there are some problems, for example, in Shanghai, there is a level of inequity and 
insufficiency when the rent subsidy policy is used. In further, Zhou (2010) established a 
logistic model to analyze the factors that influence the policy effects. The results showed 
that household size, location, and people’s willingness to purchase in future seem to 
influence the policy effects.  
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, little studies in China have investigated the 
wealth effects of SOP and ROP on lowest-income households in public housing programs. 
Therefore, it is worth comparing the effects of the SOP and ROP in China. The rest of this 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.3 outlines the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
and suggests possible extra benefits. Section 4.4 describes our data and summarizes 
households’ characteristics. Section 4.5 discusses our empirical results on the extra 
benefits to each household group. Then, Section 4.6 concludes the paper by summarizing 
our main findings.  
4.3 The utility function and benefits 
This study assumes there are only two kinds of goods in the market: a housing service and 
non-housing goods. The market is assumed to be perfectly competitive and in equilibrium 
in the long run. This means that in the long run, the supply curves of the two goods are 
perfectly elastic. Housing services are measured by several attributes, including floor 
area, number of bedrooms, whether the house has a bathroom, and orientation. 
The prices of housing services and non-housing goods are HP  and CP , respectively. 
Under the public housing program, a family is offered “ H ” units of housing services. 
Households under the SOP have to pay 
s
HH P  to buy a public housing unit, and 
consume bC  units of non-housing goods by using their surplus income. Similarly, 
families under the ROP need to pay a rent of 
r
HH P  to rent the public housing unit, and 
consume rC units of non-housing goods using their surplus income. Since these are 
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public housing units, the prices, 
s
HP , and rents, 
r
HP , are lower than in commercial 
housing units in the open market. Therefore, participants in the public housing program 
obtain benefits and welfare from this program. Do households under the SOP and ROP 
obtain the same benefits and welfare? If not, which of the two obtains more? To answer 
these questions, assessing these benefits is necessary.  
The benefits to eligible households in public housing programs are equivalent to 
receiving an unrestricted cash grant, B . For households under the SOP, this is sB ; for 
households under the ROP, this is rB .Here, B refers to the difference between the market 
value and the real expenditure on the goods consumed by households under the public 
housing program. To calculate the value of the cash grants, B , this study adopt the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function
41
 to estimate households’ benefits.  
A simple form of this function is as follows: 
 
1U H C                              (4.1) 
where U  is a household’s utility; H  refers to the consumption of housing services; 
C  represents the consumption of non-housing goods. In addition,   is the proportion 
of income spent on housing by a consumer facing the following budget constraint:  
 H CH P C P Y                            (4.2) 
where the variables are defined as they were before the consumer became part of the 
housing program. Subject to the budget constraint (4.2), the consumer will maximize his 
or her utility. We solve the utility maximization problem for the consumer by using a 
Lagrangian function. The optimal solutions are as follows:  
 HH Y P  and (1 ) CC Y P                   (4.3) 
                                                             
41 Similar previous studies have mainly used three utility functions: the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
(Kraft and Olsen 1973; Murray 1975; Wong and Liu 1988.), the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
utility function (Murray 1975), and the Stone-Geary utility function (Johnson and Hurter 2000). Murray 
(1975) compared the parameters of the generalized CES and Cobb-Douglas utility functions when 
estimating the distribution of benefits in public housing programs. The author suggested that the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function may be useful for computing aggregate benefits. One of our important 
objectives is to compute the aggregate benefits of subsidized low-income households. In addition, Murray 
(1975) pointed out that the CES utility function would be the better option when studying structural 
characteristics, such as the correlation between income or age and the benefits. In our case, households a re 
eligible if they have special certifications, such as the “Certification of Minimum Subsistence Security for 
the Urban Residence,” “Certification of Five Guarantees Family,” and the “Certification of Disabled 
People.” This means that the policy does not depend only on income or age. The Stone-Geary utility 
function could be used to solve problems that involve subsistence levels of consumption (Johnson and 
Hurter 2000). In our case, the households are the lowest income households, which means all consumpt ion 
of housing services and non-housing goods are at or below subsistence levels. Hence, the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function is the most appropriate for our study.  
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In addition, by the first-order condition, optimal solutions need to satisfy the condition: 
 H CH P C P Y                            (4.4) 
This implies that the income of the consumer is used completely. Here, 
HH P  is the 
housing expenditure. Therefore, the consumption of non-housing goods (all non-housing 
goods being represented here by a composite commodity) is  
 H CC Y H P P                            (4.5) 
Next, we suppose that the consumer participates in the public housing program. Then, 
with an income of 1Y , the consumer obtains 1H  housing units and 1C  units of 
non-housing goods. He or she may obtain these under either the SOP or ROP. The two 
options do not affect the analysis. Then, the utility level of the consumer is 
 
1
1 1 1U H C
                             (4.6) 
Suppose the consumer’s taste in housing does not change. This means the value of   
remains constant while the consumer participates in the public housing program. To 
obtain 1U  in the open market, how much income is necessary for the consumer?  
For a given income, 1Y , the consumer participating in the public housing program 
would consume the following quantity of non-housing goods: 
 
11 1 1 H C
C Y H P P                          (4.7) 
In this case, CP  is constant because, in the short term, the market price of 
non-housing goods does not change. By minimizing H CH P C P   , subject to 
1
1 1 1U H C
  , to obtain 1U  in the open market, the necessary income is 
       
 
H
1-aa
e
1 1 H 1 1 HY = H P a Y - H P 1- a              (4.8) 
where 
e
HP  is the market price of the housing service, which is not affected by the 
public housing program. In our case, 
e
HP  contains the market selling price, 
es
HP , for the 
SOP and the market rent price, 
er
HP , for the ROP. In addition,  1 1Y Y  is the benefit the 
consumer obtains from the public housing program. Hence, the total benefit value for the 
consumer participating in the public housing program is given by: 
 1 1B Y Y                                 (4.9) 
Substituting the average values into equation (4.9) could obtain the average benefits. 
To compare the benefits obtained by households under the SOP and ROP, it is needed to 
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calculate 
sB  for SOP and rB  for ROP, respectively. If s rB B , the benefits obtained 
by the households under the SOP are higher, and SOP is more effective. Otherwise, ROP 
is more effective. 
To obtain the average benefits, it is needed to calculate the value of   first. In the 
short term, this study supposes that the consumer’s preference does not change, which 
means   remains constant before and after participation in the public housing program. 
Thus,   could be calculated from the values of HH P  and Y  from before the 
consumer participated in the public housing program. The value of   is the proportion 
of income spent on housing by a consumer. Hence,  
  HH P Y                              (4.10) 
4.4 Data 
This empirical study is based on cross-sectional data originating from a survey conducted 
in the city of Baoji in July 2010. Baoji is one of the biggest cities in northwest China, and 
began constructing public housing in 2006
42
. By the end of 2010, the local government of 
Baoji had constructed 4,110 public housing dwellings, with a combined building area of 
205,500 square meters. By September 2010, 1,361 dwellings were in use. Of these, 1,148 
dwelling units had been bought, and only 213 dwelling units were rented. Thus, the 
proportion of lowest-income households under the SOP was about 84.35%. By the end of 
2010, the main public housing areas were the XFY area, the CSL area, and the LFY area
43
. 
There were 984 lowest-income households living in the XFY area, which is about 72.30% 
of the lowest-income households subsidized by a public housing policy. The sample in 
this chapter comes from the XFY area of Baoji. We successfully interviewed 75
44
 
households. Our sample size is rather small
45
. When Kraft and Olsen (1973) estimated the 
relationship between the rent-income ratio and family characteristics, they used 168 
observations. They divided these observations into four groups. Three groups contained 
                                                             
42 In China, 2006 is when public housing officially began to be constructed.  
43 XFY, CSL, and LFY are the name of different areas. 
44 We used the method of random sampling to do the questionnaire.  
45 We have tried to enlarge our sample and did this investigation again in 2012. Because there are no rules 
or laws governing the sell-oriented policy, local government of Baoji city was criticized in 2012. Most 
households were not willing to be interviewed for fear of criticism or punishment.  Hence, we were not able 
to achieve a bigger sample size. 
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40 observations, with the remaining group containing 48 observations. However, the 
small number of observations did not affect their analysis. Hence, although our sample 
size is relatively small, this will affect our analysis. Of the 75 lowest-income households, 
63 bought public housing units under the SOP. The remaining 12 households rented their 
property, thus falling under the ROP. Therefore, in our survey, the proportion of 
households under the SOP is 84%, which is close to the proportion of Baoji’s overall 
figure of 84.35%. 
Our survey data includes detailed information on each house characteristic, including 
the housing area, expenditure on housing services, the living conditions, and the distance 
from the city center. For all households
46
, data on annual disposable income
47
, as well as 
other important household characteristics, such as the household size, number of children, 
age and years of schooling of the head of the household, were also collected. The survey 
collected data on the household before and after moving into the public housing. Table 
4.1 summarizes the characteristics of surveyed households.  
Table 4.1 Summary characteristics by type of subsidy 
 
Source: Summarized by the author from the survey conducted in Baoji in 2010 
                                                             
46 A household in this study refers to a family, including al l family members who are in the same Residence 
Registration Booklet, which is a certification that a person belongs to a family in an administrative region.  
47 Annual disposable income refers to the amount of money that households have available to spend and 
save after deducting income tax. 
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Local governments have flexibility in determining who is eligible and what types of 
units should be provided (Deng et al. 2009). According to the laws of the public housing 
program, eligible households need to hold a special certification, such as the 
“Certification of Minimum Subsistence Security for the Urban Residence,” “Certification 
of Five Guarantees Family,” and the “Certification of Disabled People.” These all certify 
that a person is eligible to be subsidized by the public housing program. In our sample, 
89.33% of the households hold these certifications. Table 4.1 shows that the average 
education level of a head of a household is only 9.53 years of schooling. Besides, only 
9.3% of the heads of households in our sample had received college education. The low 
average education level makes it more difficult for a household to find work as 
technology develops. In addition, the heads of the households with the average age of 
51.55 are mostly the workers who were laid off during the reformation of the state 
enterprises. Those households are easier to obtain special certifications, as well as the 
disabled people. Another criterion used to judge eligibility is annual disposable income. 
The annual disposable income per capita for urban households in Baoji was RMB 13225 
in 2008 and RMB 16346 in 2009
48
. In contrast, this value for the households in our 
survey was RMB 4089.84 in 2008 and RMB 4562.84 in 2009, or 30.93% and 27.91% of 
the urban average, respectively. Therefore, the disposable income of subsidized 
households is lower than that of the average urban household.  
Households who satisfy the above criteria have priority when it comes to receiving a 
subsidized dwelling unit. In our sample, the local government provides dwelling units to 
lowest-income households in two ways: SOP and ROP. Table 4.2 compares the 
characteristics of households under the SOP and ROP, as well as the differences before 
and after the implementation of the policies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
48 The data come from “Shanxi Statistical Yearbook in 2009.” 
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Table 4.2 Characteristics of households surveyed in Baoji 
 
Source: Summarized by the author from the data of a survey conducted in Baoji city in 2010  
Notes:  
1. For the SOP, after buying public housing, the expenditure for housing services per area per 
year is calculated by purchase price, housing area, and usage year. Housing expenditure per 
area per year equals to purchase price divided by the multiplier of housing area and usage 
year. In China, the legal limit for the usage year of residential land is 70 years, and as such, 
here, the usage year is set as 70.  
2. 
※
 Here, the highest value of housing area per capita has decreased. The main reason is 
that the housing area per capita is calculated by dividing the overall housing area by the total 
population. In the actual calculation, total population means the census  register population, 
which changed in the time before and after buying public housing. For example, the 
household with the highest housing area per capita before buying public housing contains one 
census register population. However, there are actually four people living in the house. Their 
housing area is 40 square meter. Then, by the function and policy standard, the housing area 
per capita is 40. However, after buying public housing, the census register population of the 
household would have changed to 4, with a housing area of 74 square meters. Therefore, the 
value of housing area per capita would have changed to 37.62.  
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From Table 4.2, the annual disposable income of those who choose to buy public 
housing is lower than those who choose to rent them. The reasons why there are more 
households preferring to buy public housing are as follows. First, the prices of public 
housing units are lower than the prices of commodity housing, although they provide 
similar conditions. The average price of public housing units is RMB 1100.4
49
 per square 
meter. However, the average market price for commodity houses is RMB 2711.3
50
per 
square meter, which is as 2.46 times greater than that of public housing units. Second, the 
prices of public housing units are lower than their costs. In 2006, the average costs of 
public housing units were RMB 1180 per square meter in Baoji. The prices had increased 
to RMB 1500 per square meter by 2010. In our sample, the lowest-income households 
bought the public housing units after 2007, when the price was RMB 1100.4 per square 
meter. The fact that prices are lower than costs encourages lowest-income households to 
buy public housing units. Third, in the traditional view, households favor buying public 
housing units. According to the survey, owning the fixed usage rights of public housing 
units brings more happiness and sureness to the households. The fixed usage rights 
indicate that they do not need to move frequently and could live in the houses for 70 
years. Hence, most lowest-income households want to buy public housing units. Fourth, 
lowest-income households could borrow money without interest from relatives. Although 
most of the lowest-income households could not afford houses by themselves, with the 
funds borrowed from relatives, they were able to do so. In the survey, there is no interest 
when households borrow money from their relatives, which encourages lowest-income 
households to borrow money and buy public housing units.  The reasons why households 
choose to rent public housing units are the following: first, in their opinion, the 
infrastructure is not enough in the public housing community; second, they intend to 
move to other better houses when they have enough money. 
After participating in the public housing program, the annual disposable income of 
households under both the SOP
51
 and ROP increased, although the figures for the SOP 
                                                             
49 This information comes from the survey conducted in Baoji.  
50 This information comes from the China Premium Database in the CEIC Database, a database of 
comparative economic data for over 120 countries.  
51 The disposable income shows us that the average disposable income of SOP is lower than that of ROP. 
However, those a bit lower income households could buy public housing units. The reason can be explained 
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households showed a greater increase. Most of the households who buy public housing 
units have to return the borrowed money. They might do many types of work to  earn 
enough to do so. Besides, expenses for non-housing goods increased for all households 
after participating in the public housing program. This is partly because of the increase in 
annual disposable income, but also because the housing expenses decreased.  
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Estimating   
To obtain the benefits, , for households participating in the public housing program, this 
study first use equation (4.10) and the average household data before participating in the 
public housing program to calculate  .  
For households under the SOP, before participating in the public housing program, the 
average housing area per capita is 11.93 square meters. In addition, Table 4.1 shows us 
the average household size is three persons. Therefore, the average housing area per 
household is 35.79 square meters
52
 (
sH ). The average price of a house is RMB90.72 per 
square meters (
s
HP ). Hence, the average expenditure on housing services is RMB 
3246.8688. The average value of the annual disposable income is RMB 12097.01
53
 (
sY ). 
Therefore:  
 35.79 90.72 /12097.01 0.2684s s ss HH P Y        (4.11) 
In the same way, for households under the ROP, the average housing area per capita is 
5.99 square meters. Table 4.1 shows that the average household size under the ROP is 
3.75 persons. Hence, the average housing area per household is 22.4625 square meters 
(
rH ). The average rent is RMB50.64 per square meter ( rHP ). Hence, the average housing 
expenditure is RMB 1137.5010. The annual disposable income of households under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
as follows. Huang (2012) points out that the local governments have been unwilling to allocated public 
housing units by renting out, since they are more concerned about economic goals without paying attention 
to the income levels of applicants. Therefore, to some extent, it is the responsibility of the local 
governments.  
52 This chapter uses the housing area as a proxy for the consumption of housing services.  
53Actually, the expenditure on non-housing goods (shown in table 4.2) is 8373.04 RMB. The total 
expenditure for housing services and non-housing goods is equal to 11619.9088 RMB. The difference 
between total expenditure and annual disposable income is savings.  
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ROP is RMB 13951.13 (
rY ). Therefore, 
 22.4625 50.64 /13951.13 0.0815r r rr HH P Y       (4.12) 
From the above values, 
s r  , which reveals that households under the SOP have a 
stronger taste in housing than households under the ROP. A lowest-income household 
who values houses would most likely buy a public house. We can now derive the utility 
functions for households under the SOP and ROP, as follows: 
For households under the SOP, the utility function is  
 
0.2648 0.7316
sU H C                        (4.13) 
For households under the ROP, the utility function is  
 
0.0815 0.9185
rU H C                        (4.14) 
Because the sample is selected from one city, the two functions only represent the 
utilities of lowest-income households in Baoji who participated in the public housing 
program. Although our sample size was small, this could still illustrate some problems 
with the program. Using the utility functions, this study then calculates the 
profits/benefits for households under the SOP and ROP. 
4.5.2 Comparison of benefits 
Based on Equations (4.8) and (4.9), the benefits could be obtained from the public 
housing program. First, this study applies Equation (4.8) to calculate the necessary 
income for the households after participating in the public housing program. For 
households under the SOP, after buying public housing units, the per capita housing area 
is 23.18 square meters. This study assumes that household size is constant before and 
after participating in the public housing program. Hence, the average household size is 
three persons, and per household housing area is 69.54 square meters ( 1sH ). The market 
price of commercial residential housing per square meter was RMB 2711.3 in Baoji in 
2009. Since the usage years for commercial residential housing is limited to 70 years, the 
housing price per year per square meter is RMB 38.7 (
es
HP ). However, the selling price of 
public housing units per year per square meter is RMB 15.72 (
1
s
HP ), as shown in Table 4.2. 
After moving into public housing units, the annual disposable income,  1sY , is RMB 
14122.78 (see Table 4.2). Based on Equation (4.8), necessary income for households 
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under the SOP is as follows. 
    
0.73160.2684
1 69.54 38.7 0.2684 14122.78 69.54 15.72 0.7316 15268.34sY        
(4.15) 
The extra benefits obtained by households under the SOP are  
 1 1 15268.34 14122.78 1145.56s s sB Y Y      (4.16) 
In the same way, the benefits for households under the ROP could be calculated as well. 
After renting public housing units, the per capita housing area is 12.21 square meters. 
Given 3.75 persons per household, the average housing area is 45.79 square meters (
1rH ). 
The average market rent of housing per square meter is RMB 87.6 (
er
HP ) (Shu, 2012). The 
average rent for a public housing unit per square meter per year is RMB 14.64 (
1
r
HP , 
shown in Table 4.2). The average annual disposable income for households under the 
ROP is RMB 15858.5 ( 1rY , shown in Table 4.2). Therefore, the necessary income for 
households under the ROP is as follows: 
    
0.91850.0815
1 45.79 87.6 0.0815 15868.5 45.79 14.64 0.9185 18073.68rY        
(4.17) 
Based on Equation (4.9), the extra benefits of households under the ROP are 
 1 1 18073.68 15858.5 2215.18r r rB Y Y                     (4.18) 
From the outcomes shown in Equation (4.16) and (4.18), all households benefit from 
participating in the public housing program. As r sB B , the benefits obtained by 
households under the ROP are greater than those of households under the SOP.  
As out study only uses data from two years, it is difficult to ascertain the benefits to 
these households in the long term. In addition, the sample is only from Baoji. Other cities 
may show different results. Thus, we conclude that the SOP in Baoji also brings 
households extra benefits in the short term. However, the ROP appears to be the more 
effective public housing program. Therefore, the Baoji government should first adopt the 
ROP. The implementation of the SOP should be more careful.  
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4.5.3 The satisfaction on the public housing 
In the questionnaires, we surveyed 56 families’ satisfaction with the public housing program. 
The proportion of households under the SOP who felt there was a great improvement in 
wellbeing was 80%. However, this same proportion under the ROP was 75%.Hence, those 
under the SOP were more satisfied that those under the ROP. In addition, households 
evaluated the living conditions of the public housing units, such as floor space, orientation, 
distance from the city center, public facilities, and traffic conditions. Since the surveyed 
households were in the same district, there was no need to distinguish them again. The 
evaluations are shown in Table 4.3. A higher value means a greater level of satisfaction. 
There were five levels of satisfaction: “completely satisfied”= 5, “satisfied”= 4, “neutral”= 3, 
“dissatisfied”= 2, and “completely dissatisfied”= 1. 
Table 4.3 Evaluation of the public housing program 
Item Evaluation Item Evaluation 
Floor spaces 3.73 Children’s education 2.48 
Structure 3.52 Public facilities 3.24 
Floor 3.53 Sports center 3.14 
Orientation 3.64 Traffic condition 3.38 
Distance from city center 3.23 Community plan 3.56 
Distance from work place 3.06 Green belt 3.65 
Distance from supermarket 3.03 Social security 3.17 
Source: Summarized by the author from the survey conducted in Baoji in 2010 
All households are most satisfied with the floor space in the public housing units. In 
our survey, most public housing units are 66 square meters. From Table 4.2, after 
participating in the public housing program, the per capita housing area increased, 
especially for households under the SOP. However, after moving into public housing units, 
the distance from schools increased, which hinders children’s education and increases 
transportation costs. Hence, when the local government of Baoji constructs public 
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housing units, they need to consider the location more carefully. This is not just because 
they need to consider the wellbeing of those living in the houses, but also because the 
distances could mean extra subsidy costs (Johnson and Hurter, 2000).  
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter analyzes the benefits and satisfaction of households who participated in the 
public housing program in Baoji. To evaluate the effects of the SOP, this study divides the 
surveyed lowest-income households into two groups: households under the SOP and 
households under the ROP. We estimate the utility function for each group, based on 
which we calculate and compare the benefits of the households. Lastly, we summarize the 
level of households’ satisfaction on the public housing program. The main conclusions 
are as follows: 
Households joining under the SOP have a stronger taste in houses than households 
joining under the ROP. Using the survey data from Baoji, the   of households under the 
SOP is 0.2684 and that of households under the ROP is 0.0815. These results reveal that 
households under the SOP value housing consumption more than those under the ROP. 
This is one important reason why the households under the SOP prefer to buy public 
housing units, even though their incomes are lower than households under the ROP. 
Both SOP and ROP offer benefits to the households participating in the public housing 
program. However, the ROP brings greater benefits to lowest-income households than the 
SOP. After participating in the program, households under the SOP obtain an extra benefit 
of 1145.56 RMB, while households under the ROP obtain 2215.18 RMB. As a result, the 
ROP appears to be more efficient than the SOP. When the local government of Baoji 
implements the public housing program, they should first adopt the ROP, and control the 
units of public housing sold, as this is the less efficient policy. To achieve policy 
efficiency, restricting resale by the purchasers is the key point (Ho 1995).  
Both SOP and ROP households are dissatisfied with the public facilities supplied to the 
public housing units, in terms of children’s education, because the public housing units 
are a little too far from the schools. Therefore, the local government should carefully 
consider where they will build the public housing units. The public facilities around 
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public housing units need to be improved. 
That this study only had 75 households in our sample poses some limitations. In 
addition, the lack of data from other regions of China is another limitation. This chapter 
could be used as a foundation for further research into the effects of the SOP and ROP for 
the entire country. Another possible area for future research would be to explore the 
effects of the public housing program from the point of view of society as a whole,  rather 
than just lowest-income household. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
5.1 Summary of main results 
This study illustrates the main problems of China’s housing market. According to 
previous studies (Ren et al., 2012; Barth et al., 2012; Zhang, 2011), the growth rate of 
China’s housing prices have resulted in high prices; as a result, urban households face the 
problem of being unable to afford housing units (Chen, 2012; Shen, 2012; Liu et al., 
2008). Liu et al. (2008) argued that an affordable housing program could ease the 
affordability problem for middle- and low-income households. For the lowest-income 
families, renting houses is not even an option in the market (Liu et al., 2008), which is 
why the public housing program is also necessary. Therefore, a multi -level housing 
market system was established in China, including a general housing market, an 
affordable housing market, and a public housing market. Based on the  previous literature 
and analysis of markets, the current problems of China’s housing markets are the high 
growth rate of housing prices, decreasing construction of affordable housing, and the 
selling of public housing units to the lowest-income households although under a case of 
a shortage of stock. Given these problems, this study illustrates the macroeconomic 
determinants of housing prices, the crowding-out effects of affordable housing 
construction, and the utility effects of the sell-oriented policy on households. The main 
conclusions of this study are summarized in the following.  
The main factors that push real housing prices up are real land prices and real 
disposable income. Owing to the negative effects of the mortgage rate, in order to ease 
the problem of the high growth rate of housing prices, the central bank could take the 
measure of raising the mortgage rate. Another method of decreasing housing prices is 
encouraging developers to supply more housing, for which decreasing the construction 
costs of developers is an option. Therefore, it could be concluded that reducing land 
prices and its related transaction costs is the effective method.  
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Although real disposable income is an important factor in pushing housing prices up, 
income and wealth inequality render middle- and low-income households unable to afford 
housing units. The affordable housing program aims to help those households afford 
houses, by supplying real estate enterprises subsidies to construct affordable housing 
units. However, affordable housing construction is crowded-out by unaffordable housing 
construction, and the crowding-out effects are related to the urbanization rate. To address 
this, the government should take measures to encourage real estate enterprises to 
construct more affordable housing by supplying more subsidies and further reducing 
transaction taxes for selling affordable housing.  
As a supplement to the affordable housing program, the public housing program targets 
the lowest-income households that cannot even rent houses in the market. This program 
started officially in 2006 and the major providers are the local governments, who should 
be responsible for at least 50% of the construction fund. Therefore, the development of 
this program is slow, resulting in a shortage in the stock of public housing units.  However, 
to recover the fund rapidly, the local governments began to sell public housing units to 
the lowest-income households, which was not permitted in the related law. According to 
our results, the sell-oriented policy could offer benefits to the households as well, but the 
rent-oriented policy would offer more benefits. Hence, the local government should be 
more careful to opt for the sell-oriented policy. 
5.2 Limitations and future work 
Shortage of data for the affordable housing market and a small sample size for the public 
housing market are the two main barriers to analyzing the problems of the two-level 
housing markets. Both affordable and public housing programs are subsidy policies on 
the basis of the supply side. Policy aimed at the demand side is also implemented, which 
is known as the “Housing Provident Fund” program. This program is a compulsory 
housing savings program, under which both employers and their employees contribute a 
certain percentage of the employees’ wages, at least 5%, to “Housing Provident Fund” 
accounts that are administered by the China Construction Bank (Deng et al., 2009). In 
return, when employees purchase houses, they could get low-interest mortgage loans 
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from the Housing Provident Fund. This program also greatly helps households afford 
houses. However, this study does not analyze the problems of the Housing Provident 
Fund program, which is another limitation. 
Future research should explore the effects and problems of the “Housing Provident 
Fund” program, which would be a complementary study of China’s housing market. 
Future work should also include enlarging the data and sample sizes to complete the 
related research.  
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